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NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT
TRAUMATIC VESSEL SOURCE OIL POLLUTION
ANDREW W. ANDERSON*
In this article, the author outlines the enormous economic,
human, and ecological damage caused by traumatic vessel source
oil pollution. After an examination of the technical context of the
problem, he explores current international and national efforts to
combat the problem such as construction standards, traffic regu-
lation, and crew training. He concludes that effective prevention
technology is currently available, but awaits implementation
through international cooperation.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
A. Traumatic Vessel Source Oil Pollution
Within the past decade, the subject of oil has grown in impor-
tance until it seems to impinge on our consciousness during every
moment and in relation to every area of thought and activity. We
are constantly bombarded by discussions of oil as a scarce but vital
commodity, oil as a tool of world power politics, oil as a target of
world strategies, oil as inducing a world economic crisis and even
oil as a world threatening pollutant. Given the crisis atmosphere
* J.D., University of Miami; Former Member, University of Miami Law Review; Lt.
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generated by some of these problems, one might think that the
pollution threat associated with oil spillage would receive short
shrift in the allocation of world priorities and concerns. That this
has not occurred is eloquent testimony to the growing world aware-
ness of the severity of the oil pollution problem and the necessity
for positive steps to protect the global marine ecosystem.
. While the steps that have been taken have often been faltering
and small, their very accomplishment in an era of increasing pa-
ralysis in the arena of multilateral, international cooperation is no
small feat. One aspect of this continuing fight against oil pollution
which has not received the attention it deserves is international and
national efforts toward the prevention of traumatic vessel source oil
pollution of the marine environment.' Although traumatic pollu-
tion, which arises primarily from collisions and groundings of ves-
sels, originally generated much of the initial concern about marine
oil pollution, the primary focus of world efforts to deal with the
problem has shifted to other areas of oil pollution concern such as
the imposition of greater legal liability for spills and discharges,
compensation for oil pollution damage, and prevention of opera-
tional oil pollution.'
Nevertheless, the analysis of traumatic vessel source oil pollu-
tion at this time presents a more useful approach to the problem of
significantly reducing oil pollution than do these other methods.
Potential liability for oil pollution damage has some deterrent or
preventive effect, but it has been the subject of such exhaustive
analysis, ' and so many statutory enactments' and international co-
1. The term "traumatic" oil pollution, as will be explained more fully, is applied to oil
pollution that results from an unexpected and abnormal occurrance which causes damage to
the physical containment system of the oil and results in spillage. The terms "marine environ-
ment" or "marine ecosystem" refer to the total life system of the world's oceans and coastal
zones including neritic and oceanic biota, the hydrologic cycle, and biota of the coastal and
littoral zones. These terms also take into account the extent to which marine and littoral life
systems exercise a significant influence on one another (including influences concerning es-
tuarine systems, coastal salt marshes, etc.).
2. The term "operational" oil pollution is generally used to refer to oil pollution that
arises as part of the normal operations and procedures of oil storage, transfer, and transporta-
tion systems. Examples include bilge pumping, tank washing and de-ballasting.
3. For a detailed analysis of liability of oil pollution damage, see Bergman, No Fault
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 1 (1973); Goldie, Liability for
Oil Pollution, 6 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 303 (1975); Goria, Compensation for Oil Pollution at
Sea: An Insurance Approach, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 717 (1975); Meiklejohn, Liability for Oil
Pollution Clean-up and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 973
(1970); Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution - - - Domestic and International
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operative efforts5 that it has little remaining potential for stimulat-
ing further reduction in vessel source oil pollution. The effectiveness
of assessing liability for damage already incurred or providing com-
pensation therefore as a means of protecting the environment is
further limited by the fact that even when the questions of such
liability and compensation have arisen, irreversible damage, for
which there cannot be an adequate remedy, has already occurred.'
Ecologically, it is better to prevent the spill and damage in the first
place than to worry about complicated compensation schemes
which can do little to restore the natural balance once it has been
altered.
Similarly, control of oil pollution after its escape through clean-
up, restoration, and limitation of the actual spillage is of limited
value in attempting to reduce total vessel source oil pollution. While
invaluable in minimizing damage to the environment once the spill
has occurred, the control of such spills does little to prevent the
initial traumatic incident. This highly technical area has been
largely left to the scientists and engineers' with the exception of one
Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1969); Pearson, Admiralty Remedies for Vessel Oil Pollution
of Navigable Waters, 7 TEX INT'L L.J. 121 (1971); Post, A Sollution to the Problem of Private
Compensation in Oil Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 524 (1974); Post, Private
Compensation for Injuries Sustained by the Discharge of Oil from a Vessel, 4 J. MARITIME L.
& COM. 25 (1973).
4. See, e.g., The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(Supp. III, 1973); Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1970, FLA. STAT.
§§ 376.011-21 (1975); Marine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1970,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 38 §§ 541 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Washington Water Pollution Control
Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.48.315-.336 (Supp. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29, 1969,
9 INT'L LEG. MAT. 45 (1970); Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971, 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 284 (1972); Doud,
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Further Comment on the Civil Liability and Com-
pensation Fund Conventions, 4 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 525 (1973); Healy, The International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, I J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 317 (1970);
Hunter, The Proposed International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, 4 J. MARITIME L. & COM.
117 (1973).
6. See California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969); accord, Maine
v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Me. 1973), concerning the right of a State to recover,
as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens, for oil pollution damages to the waters themselves.
The assessment of a dollar value of ecological damage remains extremely difficult because of
the aesthetic and societal values involved as well as the little understood complexities of the
ecosystem. Quaere: May the United States bring an action as parens patriae for oil pollution
damage to the living resources and fisheries of the Continental Shelf beyond the limits of
State jurisdiction?
7. At least a minimal understanding of control techniques and difficulties is essential
for a complete grasp of the problems of dealing with the oil pollution problem. For a presenta-
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agreement on jurisdiction to take control measures.
Prevention of traumatic pollution, however, prevents the oil
from entering the environment in the first place and not only ob-
viates the need for litigation and its associated expense, but totally
dispenses with costly clean-up operations and the capital invest-
ment in equipment and organization necessary for large scale clean-
up. Another prime benefit of traumatic pollution prevention efforts
is the avoidance of the traumatic incidents themselves. These inci-
dents such as collisions and groundings not only cause pollution
damage, but are costly in terms of lives lost, injuries, damage to
ships and cargoes, lost time due to repairs, interference with com-
merce caused by wreckage and clean-up operations, as well as eco-
nomic and personal suffering and related social costs.' Moreover,
with increasing energy costs and shortages, the saving of the oil
itself becomes a desirable goal.
tion of fundamentals, see generally R. DEAN, THE CHEMISTRY OF CRUDE OILS IN RELATION To
THEIR SPILLAGE ON THE SEA, in Hearings on H.R. 6495 Before the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91, pt. 4, at 285 (1969); W. LEHR & R.
ABRAHAMS, OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT in Joint Hearings Before the Special
Joint Subcomm. on Deepwater Port Legislation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Interior
and Insular Affairs, and Public Works on S. 1751 and S. 2232, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-
59, pt. 1, at 248-278 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate DWP Hearingsl; Swift, Touhill,
Templeton & Roseman, Oil Spillage Prevention, Control and Restoration-State of the Art
and Research Needs, in OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 31 (S. Degler ed. 1969). For
an excellent collection of essays dealing with the scientific aspects of oil pollution, the spread
of oil slicks, chemical dispersants, slick removal and containment and collection devices, see
OIL ON THE SEA (D. Hoult ed. 1969). For a thorough analysis of control techniques and their
associated capital, manpower, and operating costs, see DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, COMBATTING POLLUTION CREATED BY OIL SPILLS (1969).
8. The Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT. 25 (1970), gives a coastal nation pollution
control jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas in limited circumstances where the
state is threatened with oil pollution. Under domestic law, negligence in control efforts by
the government can also result in liability to damaged third parties. See Burgess v. MN
Tamano, 373 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Me. 1974).
9. LLOYD'S REGISTER OF SHIPPING (1975) reports that the year 1974, saw an all-time high
for vessel losses. A total of 71 vessels with a registered tonnage of 681,706 tons were lost at
sea, resulting in an economic loss in ships and cargoes of $273 million. Every year, there are
over 2,400 casualties of all types involving an average of 4,000 vessels. Of these, an average
of 344 are total losses. Bates & Yost, Where Trends the Flow of Merchant Ships? in THE LAW
OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEAN, 249, 263 (J. Gamble ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Bates & Yost]. In the United States, losses from collisions, groundings and rammings
are reported at the rate of $40 million per year, but actual losses are probably in excess of
$200 million; the discrepancy is due to failure to file required reports. There are an estimated
56 people killed and 52 injured each year in the United States by such incidents and an
estimated 2.35 million gallons of pollutants spilled. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 1 VESSEl.
TRAFFIC ISSUE, STUDY 4 (1973).
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Although the prevention of traumatic pollution has not at-
tracted the world attention which has been afforded operational
vessel source oil pollution," ' the attention to operational vessel
source pollution prompted the adoption in 1973 of a comprehensive
international convention dealing with that problem and, to a lesser
extent, traumatic pollution." Since that time, the area of traumatic
oil pollution prevention has been the subject of increased legislative
and technical initiatives.
The chief areas of endeavor in traumatic pollution prevention
are multilateral, international efforts and unilateral, or national
efforts. World response to the threat of this age-old well recognized
pollutant 2 will be a test of the international ability to cooperate
legislatively 3 in coping with the pollution caused by other politi-
10. Operational oil pollution not only includes that pollution which arises normally and
predictably from routine operations associated with maritime transportation of oil, but also
includes negligent discharges caused by human error and oversight, hose rupture, and other
spills which are part of the normal risk associated with such operations.
11. The 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973,
12 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as the 1973 Convention]. Ratification
of the 1973 Convention has been postponed by many nations pending the outcome of the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. The 1973 Convention creates an effective
prevention and enforcement system accompanied by detailed technical annexes. It represents
the culmination of over 50 years of effort and with full implementation will eliminate almost
all operational pollution. The adoption of the 1973 Convention will effectively limit further
advances until world reaction to the far reaching proposals of the 1973 Convention are mea-
sured.
12. Oil pollution first became a major problem just after the turn of the century. With
the increased use of the automobile and airplane, and with the replacement of coal by oil as
the major fuel for shipping and industry, maritime transport of oil increased. This increase
was accompanied by a marked rise in the number of incidents of marine oil pollution. The
United States called the first international conference on oil pollution in Washington, D.C.
in 1926. All of the 73 nations present signed a convention banning oil discharges within 50
miles of a coast, but none ratified it. Resolution Noting Damage Done by Oil Pollution and
Calling for an International Conference to Deal with the Problem, 42 STAT. 821 (1922); 4
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (1965). In 1930 subsequent attempts to deal
with the problem at the Hague were also unsuccessful. Further attempts were interrupted
by World War II when large scale torpedoings of oil tankers brought the problem of traumatic
oil pollution to world attention. See generally Wule, Contiguous Zones for Pollution Control,
3 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 537 (1972).
13. It must be remembered that "the energy of economic exploitation seems far greater
than the energy of community welfare on all levels of social organization." Only legislation,
national or international, has been effective to control pollution. Economic controls do not
exist. The implementation of complex environmental controls limiting industrial use of air
and water is a major factor in diminishing profits, while unlimited use of air and water by
industry is synonymous with higher profits. Ultimately, however, the costs of pollution,
whether in the form of a ruined environment or in the form of increased costs due to controls,
are borne by society. A. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES 221 (197:3).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cally and strategically important commodities." Attempts to deal
with vessel source oil pollution can provide a model for pollution
control efforts generally. This contention is strengthened by several
factors. First, since vessels are polluters of the sea,' the technical
aspects of vessel source oil pollution have received great attention.
Therefore, the lack of empirical data which hampers prevention
efforts in other areas is not present here. Additionally, ships are true
subjects of international law, constantly crossing international
boundaries, and the world shipping industry is an important eco-
nomic and strategic area of commerce. Finally, the problems of
vessel source pollution have been the subject of historic as well as
contemporary international cooperative efforts."
The presence of all these factors 7 creates a situation ripe for
14. Plans or measures aimed at regulating oil pollution of the marine environment aris-
ing from a myriad of commercial and state activities must take into account the politically
acceptable, the scientifically possible, the technically feasible, and the commercially toler-
able. This combination of factors results in pollution standards which are a sort of institu-
tional lowest common denominators. See Mensah, THE IMCO EXPERIENCE, in LAW, INSTITU-
TIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 237, 241-45 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972). See also Friedman,
A Law of the Sea Conference- Who Needs It?, in INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS AND THE FUTURE
OF OCEAN SPACE 44 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974); Serwer, International Cooperation for Pollution
Control, id. at 178; Dole & Strong, Ocean Politics at the United Nations, 50 ORE. L. REV.
378 (1971); Fleisher, An International Convention on Environmental Cooperation Among
Nations, 7 TEX. INT'L L.J. 73 (1971); Hull & Koera, Convention on the International Environ-
ment Protection Agency: A Proposal, 52 BOSTON U.L. REV. 690 (1972).
15. Vessels of all types (military, freighters, tankers, etc.) are thought to account for
about 95 percent of all maritime oil pollution. Hardy, Definition and Forms of Marine
Pollution, in 3 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 73, 74 (S. Lay ed. 1973). Of this total,
tanker and transfer operations account for about half of all pollution. Porricelli, Oil Spills:
Causes, Quantities, Sources-The Magnitude of the Problem, in ASSESSlNc THE SOCIAl, IM..
PACTS OF OIL SPILLS 3 (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1973).
16. The first successful attempt to deal with vessel source oil pollution was the 1954
International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done May 13,
1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989 [19611 pt. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332 [hereinafter cited as
the 1954 Conventioni. As of January, 1975, 51 countries, controlling in excess of 60 percent
of the world's tanker tonnage, were parties to the 1954 Convention. R. SHINN, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE POLLUTION CONTROL 64 (1974); TREATIES IN FORCE, 354 (U.S. Dept.
of State Pub. No. 8755, 1974). The 1954 Convention was amended in 1962 by amendments
which went into force in 1967. See 1962 Amendments to the Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil done May 18, 1967, [19671 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109,
600 U.N.T.S. 332. Subsequent amendments in 1969 and 1971 have not yet gone into effect.
The necessary acceptance by two-thirds of the parties awaits the outcome of ongoing law of
the sea negotiations. See 1969 Amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, done Jan. 16, 1970, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1 (1970); 1971 Amendments to the
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, adopted Oct. 15, 1971, 11 INT'L
LEt;. MAT. 267 (1972).
17. Other factors not discussed, except peripherally, include the important role that oil
[Vol. 30:985
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solution. A study of the success or lack thereof in this area can
provide valuable lessons for other areas of pollution prevention.
Efforts by individual states of the United States to deal with
the problem of traumatic spillage are growing and are an important
aspect of the solution to the problem. The study of such efforts
presents complex constitutional issues"8 beyond the scope of this
article. Likewise, private parties such as industrial or environmen-
tal groups also have a major effect, but their participation is so
varied and differs so greatly in effect, that a comprehensive treat-
ment must be left to others.
What is relevant, however, to any discussion of traumatic oil
pollution prevention, is an examination of the nature and magni-
tude of the threat of oil pollution of the marine environment as well
as an examination of the particular legal and technical problems
associated with vessel source pollution.
B. Effects of Oil Pollution on the Marine Environment
Despite the political, social, and economic impacts of trau-
matic oil pollution, the main focus of concern remains on the great
potential for ecological damage. Gallon for gallon, oil is one of the
most persistent and destructive of pollutants found in the environ-
ment in large quantities." Oil discharged into the water disrupts the
food chain by forming an oily slick which poisons and smothers its
base of algae, plankton, and intertidal organisms.2" Since these
small creatures are the initial source of food for larger creatures and
eventually man, their absence has repercussions throughout the en-
and maritime transport play in world economic and political affairs. This role, particularly
the use of oil as a political weapon by the OPEC countries, must constantly be borne in mind.
Also not discussed, but terribly important, are the ongoing discussions at the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea (concerning coastal state jurisdiction over foreign vessels)
which may drastically alter the legal context of pollution prevention efforts.
18. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). See generally Post, A Solution to the
Problem of Private Compensation in Oil Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 524. 543-
46 (1974).
19. This oil may take the form of dense, persistent fractions such as crude, heating or
asphaltic oil or lighter, more volatile fractions such as gasoline and diesel oil. See generally
SHINN, supra, note 16 at 6; Schacter & Serwer, Maine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 88-89 (1971).
20. COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, OCEAN DUMPING:
A NATIONAL POLICY 12-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORTI; Waldichuk, Coastal
Marine Pollution and Fish, 2 OCEAN MANAGEMENT 7, 41 (1974).
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tire ecosystem. Moreover, organisms which are not killed outright
may absorb oil droplets, introducing the toxins into the food chain
at other stages."' These surviving organisms (themselves polluted)
may be bioaccumulated by filter feeder organisms which are then
consumed by other organisms. The toxic pollutants originally ab-
sorbed, move up the food chain in increasing concentration. Thus,
man, highest on the food chain, is subject to the highest concentra-
tion of toxic materials.2
Oil also settles on the ocean bottom and coats the seaweed
causing it to be easily torn free by wave action, resulting in beach
erosion. At the same time, some oil begins to biodegrade,2" reducing
the life supporting dissolved oxygen in the water available to living
organisms."' Other effects may include tainting of food fish, interfer-
ence with natural instincts, habitat changes, and disruption of life
systems.25 The slick itself interferes with phytoplankton photosyn-
thesis, the food source for much of the world's protein and a source
of oxygen for the atmosphere.2" Interference with water evaporation
21. Blumer, Oil Pollution of the Ocean, in OIL ON THE SEA 5 (D. Hoult ed. 1969). See
infra note 30.
22. Waldichuk, supra note 20, at 41. Filter feeders are organisms which pass huge quanti-
ties of water through their bodies, straining out food by the use of fine hair-like filters. Toxins
which are present in the water in non-lethal quantities may be strained out by such creatures
and concentrated at levels which are poisonous to man. The operation of the food chain and
bio-accumulation are demonstrated as follows: 1,000 lbs. of phytoplankton are consumed by
100 lbs. of zooplankton or shellfish, which in turn feed 50 lbs. of anchovies or other small fish.
These are consumed by 10 lbs. of small carnivores, which is eaten by one pound of large
carnivore which is caught and eaten by man. The one pound of carnivore eaten by man
contains essentially the same accumulated pollutants as the 1,000 lbs. of phytoplankton. M.
SCHWAwrz & E. RABIN, THE POLLUTION CRISES: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 120 (1972). See also Pome-
roy, The Oceans Food Web, A Changing Paradigm, 24 Bio. Sci. 499 (1974).
2:3. Biodegradation is a process whereby the organic compounds contained in hydrocar-
bons or other pollutants are attacked by natural decaying processes such as bacteria. This
process requires oxygen which is found dissolved in the water. In situations where natural
conditions have already lowered the dissolved oxygen content of water, the addition of biode-
gradable materials may remove sufficient oxygent to reduce that available for fish and other
organisms below the level necessary to sustain life.
24. See CEQ REPORT, supra note 20, n.16 at 14; Waldichuk, supra note 20, at 41.
25. See CEQ REPORT, supra note 20, at 12-17.
26. Id. at 12; Dying Oceans, Poisoned Seas, TIME, Nov. 8, 1971, at 74. This reduced
output of oxygen leads to an increase in the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere (phyto-
plankton also absorb carbon dioxide). Carbon dioxide inhibits re-radiation of solar heat and
the increase could result in insolation or the "greenhouse" effect whereby the ambient tem-
perature of the earth's atmosphere is sufficiently raised to melt the polar ice caps and raise
sea level by 200 feet. See Hull & Koers, A Regime for World Pollution Control, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE 83, 96 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974).
[Vol. 30:985
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may cause reduced water vapor in the air with a proportionate de-
crease in rainfall.
2 7
In addition to genetic changes and deformities, observers have
reported increasing cancerous lesions on fish in areas of high oil
pollution, 2 raising the specter that oil pollution may induce cancer
in man. Although not conclusively established, studies have indi-
cated a strong possibility of a connection between oil pollution and
some forms of cancer, while the presence of known carcinogens in
refined oils has been established.
29
The effects of oil pollution are perhaps most readily observable
on the beaches. In addition to the sticky mess covering everything
from bathers to boats, oil has proven an especially fatal attraction
to birds and marine animals.6 The oil removes the protective water-
proof coating from fur and feathers resulting in a loss of buoyancy
and insulation, often resulting in death by drowning or exposure. An
even slower death awaits those which die from ingested oil toxicosis
or simple starvation from the loss of flight or swimming capability."
Despite efforts to prevent these results, untold thousands of birds
perish every year.
12
27. CEQ REPORT, supra note 20, at 12; Weller, Oil: Its Properties and Environmental
Elfects, in ASSESSING THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF OIL SPILLS 193 (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 1973) [hereinafter the main work will be cited as SOCIAL IMPACTSj.
28. SHINN, supra note 16, at 10.
29. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, CANCER AND POiYCYCiIC AROMATIC
HYDROCARBON COMPOUNDS, Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 115-17. This study, con-
ducted by M.I.T., found that oil pollution is a distinct health threat in view of the 100-200
lbs. of known carcinogens contained in every 10,000 tons of oil spilled. See also M. SCHWARTZ
& E. RABIN, THE POLLUTION CRISIS: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 124 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
POLLUTION CRISISI; Holcomb, Oil in the Ecosystem, 166 SCIENCE 204, 205 (1969); Waldichuk,
supra note 20, at 41.
3:0. Some authorites have speculated that they may mistake the slick for calm waters.
:31. SECRETARIES OF THE INTERIOR AND TRANSPORTATION, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
POLLUTION OF THE NATION'S WATER BY OIL AND OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES , (1968)
[hereinafter cited as SECRETARIES REPORT].
32. The survival rate is very low; only a few hundred of the 7,000 birds contaminated by
the Torrey Canyon survived. Id. Reports indicate that in excess of 10,000 waterfowl are killed
each year off Alaska by de-ballasting tankers. POLLUTION CRISIS, supra note 29, at 55.
Hundreds of penguin-like murre are reportedly killed daily by tankers cleaning tanks off
southeast Newfoundland. R. WAGNER, THE ENVIRONMENT AND MAN 167 (1971). Despite the use
of noisemakers by the Coast Guard to frighten them off, hundreds of birds were recently killed
by an oil spill near a bird sanctuary in Philadelphia. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1975, at 52, col. 7;
id., Feb. 6, 1975, at 35, col. 1.
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C. Patterns and Magnitude of Marine Oil Pollution
One of the most unfortunate aspects of oil pollution is that most
pollution occurs in the areas which are of greatest ecological impor-
tance and which are most vulnerable to the harmful effects of pollu-
tion.* The world's coastal and estuarine ecosystems are the most
productive areas for organic matter; however, because of the deli-
cately balanced life systems, they are also the most easily disrupted
by the damaging nature of oil pollution." Since the great bulk of
maritime activity occurs in the coastal zone, these systems are sub-
jected to a constant bombardment of pollution. Nor is such damage
confined to the coastal waters. As ocean currents spread the pollu-
tion far and wide, few areas of the world are left unmarked by the
characteristic tar-like lumps of chronic oil pollution. :"
The international ramifications of the problem are easily un-
derstood when one realizes that today's spill of Arab oil, bound for
England in an Italian manned tanker, owned by an American but
registered in Liberia, resulting from a collision off West Africa with
a Norwegian freighter, will eventually result in pollution of Carib-
bean and South Florida beaches.3" Such ramifications are particu-
33. An estimated 80 percent of spills occur within 10 miles off shore, 75 percent within
25 miles of a port, 85 percent off a coastal recreation area. Hardy, Definition and Forms of
Marine Pollution, in 3 NEW DREc'rIoNs IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 73, n.16 at 74 (S. Lay ed, 1973).
An estimated 65-75 percent of collisions and groundings occur near a harbor entrance or
within a harbor. Another 16-25 percent occur within the coastal zone. Porricelli, supra note
15, at 4-5.
:34. While the average wheatfield produces about 1.5 tons per acre, a typical coastal
marsh produces 10 tons of organic matter per acre. R. WAGNER, ENVIRONMENT ANO MAN 152
(1971). The Japanese have succeeded in producing 23 tons of oyster meat per acre per year
in the coastal zone using advanced aquaculture techniques. Marx, The Oceans are Vastly
Overrated as a Source of Food and Fuel, SMITHSONIAN, June 1974, at 29.
:35. After a few weeks exposure to air and sun, evaporation, absorption, biodegradation
and auto-oxidation have reduced the oil to about 15 percent of its original volume in the form
of a dense, asphaltic tar balls about the size of a softball. Pearson, Admiralty Remedies for
Vessel Oil Pollution on Navigable Waters, 7 TEX. INT'L L.J. 121, n.14 at 123 (1971). The tar
balls are found in great numbers throughout the world. A recent NOAA survey found vast
areas of the Atlantic as well as 80 percent of the Caribbean and 90 percent of the Antilles
polluted by such debris. Lyons, Chemical Debris Fouling Atlantic, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13,
1973, at 22, col. 1. An estimated 87,000 tons of these tar balls are added to the oceans each
year. Knauss, Ocean Pollution: Status and Prognostication, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE
EMERGIN; REGIME OF THE OCEANS 313, 329 (J. Gamble ed. 1973). A 30-50 percent decrease
during the past 20 years in the vitality of the ocean has already been estimated by Jacques
Cousteau. Dying Oceans, Poisoned Seas, TIME, Nov. 8, 1971, at 74.
36. This example is not as far-fetched as it seems. The infamous Torrey Canyon went
aground in the English Channel in March 1967 spilling an estimated 15 million gallons of oil
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larly significant in international straits, such as the Straits of Ma-
lacca, which are travelled by thousands of foreign ships and tankers
each year with many accidents and resulting pollution. While Mala-
sia and Indonesia, the coastal states bordering the Straits, are vi-
tally concerned with protecting their fisheries and environment,
states such as Japan, which receive most of their oil supply through
such straits, are reluctant to recognize coastal state authority to
impose prohibitory safety requirements.37 The situation is further
complicated by United States and Russian strategic naval interests.
The solution to these vital international concerns has further
been hampered by both a lack of accurate figures as to the actual
amount of oil pollution taking place, and the failure to adopt a
uniform system of reference terms, resulting in great confusion.
While the United States is currently a leader in maintaining records
on reported spills,38 a recent survey of world governments revealed
widespread ignorance on the part of many nations as to exact quan-
tities of oil spilled, damages caused, and resulting clean-up costs.
The survey also indicated that clean-up efforts are relatively rare,
while oil pollution of all kinds is widespread. Nevertheless, while the
lack of a comprehensive international reporting system severely
and polluting thousands of miles of French and English beaches. It was owned by a Bermuda
corporation which was controlled by an American oil company, registered in Liberia, on
charter to a British oil company, crewed by Italians, salvaged by the Dutch and insured by
United States and British underwriters. Comment, Post "Torrey Canyon": Toward a New
Solution to the Problem of Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 CONN. L. REV. 632, 637-38 (1970). See
also E. COWAN, OI1, AND WATER-THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968).
37. The problem was vividly illustrated in January, 1975 when the Japanese super-
tanker, Showa Maru grounded in the Strait, spilling more than 3,300 tons of oil. Over the
years, the Japanese have paid millions for pollution damage to the Straits and have otfered
to pay for the upgrading of navigational facilities and aids. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 4,
col. 1; id., Jan. 8, 1975, at 4, col. 4; Hartley, Troubled Waters: When is a Strait International?
When Territorial?, The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 30, 1972, at 40, col. 1; Sterba, Two Nations
Claim Malacca Strait, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1972, at 9, col. 1.
38. The Coast Guard, as the nation's primary agency for maritime law enforcement,
shipping regulation and safety, aids to navigation, maritime search and rescue, and marine
environmental protection, although an armed force, has found itself with overall responsibil-
ity for dealing with many phases of the oil pollution problem. Within the past few years the
Coast Guard has attempted to locate and trace every oil spill in United States waters-a
monumental task. Recently computerization has allowed instant analysis of reported spills
by size, location, source, clean-up-cost etc. These figures are published annually by the
Department of Transportation in POLLUTING INCIDENTS IN AND AROUND U.S. WATERS. It must
be remembered that such figures represent only reported spills and do not include the literally
thousands of small unreported spills. Further, trends in figures do not necessarily represent
an increase or decrease in actual pollution since the reporting system is relatively new and
increased reporting of actual decreasing pollution, etc. is a possibility.
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hampers efforts to accurately deal with the problem, there can be
no doubt that world traumatic oil pollution costs, measured in dam-
age to vessels, fisheries, ecology, lost oil, and clean-up efforts, runs
into tens of millions of dollars annually."
As long as reports of actual pollution remain sketchy and uncol-
lated, it is necessary to rely on statistical estimates of pollution
source contributions and quantities." Only in this manner can fig-
ures for operational oil pollution resulting from bunker deballast-
ing," tank deballasting, washing,42 or traumatic spillage be included
in the calculation of the cost effectiveness of proposed preventive
measures and the hard political and economic decisions made which
39. INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION, OFFICIAL RECoRDS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONFERENCE ON MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE, (1969).
40. For this reason, all statistics on oil pollution should not be taken as absolutes, but
merely as valuable estimates of relative contributions of various sources. Land sources, in-
cluding industrial wastes and accidents, refinery activities, automobile emissions, urban and
river runoff, as well as over 3.5 million gallons of waste automotive crankcase oil per year,
are by far the greatest source of maritime oil pollution since all these spills, large and small,
eventually find their way into the sea. Of maritime based pollution sources, ships are the
greatest polluters. See note 15 supra. Operational vessel source pollution estimates vary from
as low as 1.5 million metric tons per year to as high as 2.5 million metric tons per year. Figures
on traumatic oil spill estimates are difficult to obtain. Some authorities state that traumatic
incidents are responsible for as much as two-thirds of all vessel source oil pollution while
others attribute only 18 percent to such casualties. Bates & Yost, supra note 9, at 249, 270,
280; J. PORRICELLI & V. KEITH, AN ANALYSIS OF OIL OUTFLOWS DUE TO TANKER ACCIDENTS 5
(U.S. Coast Guard Report 1973); G. WILSON, MAN'S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 266
(1970). See generally A. ANDERSON & W. BISSELL, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE PRE-
VENTION OF MARINE OIL POLLUTION 23-32, Table 2-1 at 26 (Sea Grant Technical Bulletin No.
33, 1975). One effort to control land based pollution sources, a politically sensitive interna-
tional issue between developed and developing nations, is found in Annex III of the Conven-
tion on Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, done March 22, 1974,
13 INT'L LEG. MAT. 546, 556 (1974).
41. De-ballasting is the removal of water ballast which is placed in empty fuel or cargo
oil tanks to preserve vessel stability. When the water is placed in the tanks, it mixes with
the "clingage", or the oil left clinging to the side of the tank. When the tank is de-ballasted,
this oil and water mixture becomes a pollutant. SECRETARIES REPORT, supra note 31, at 6.
42. The figures for tanker de-ballasting and tank washing are arrived at in a similar
manner. Clingage is estimated at 0.4 percent of total cargo capacity in deadweight tons,
approximately 33-50 percent of tonnage is ballasted and the percentage of oil discharged is
15 percent in de-ballasting and 100 percent in tank cleaning. Tanks are cleaned an average
of twice a year and de-ballasted eight times a year. Using these figures, it is possible to
estimate the total annual operational pollution generated by a tanker (or all tankers) by
multiplying its deadweight tonnage by 1.4 percent or approximately 1,400 long tons of oil
pollution per year for a vessel of 100,000 DWT. Hunter, Possibilities and Problems of Prevent-
ing Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 4 TRANS. L.J. 21, 40-43 (1972). See also Zachairiasen, Oil
Pollution in the Sea: Problems for Future Work, in INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 4 (1968).
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affect traumatic pollution prevention." The lack of a uniform sys-
tem of reference for measuring vessel size" or the amounts of oil
spilled"' has not only led to a lack of appreciation of the quantities
43. Traumatic spillage is easily calculated only when the amount of oil in the vessel prior
to the casualty can be compared to that remaining afterward. The economic decisions which
have to be made might include, for example, whether the ecological saving justifies the
economic cost of requiring such systems as the Load-On-Top System (LOT), whereby oil is
loaded and off-loaded from the top of the tank and the density difference between oil and
water is utilized to minimize mixing. Approximately 80 percent of the world's tankers by
tonnage are equipped with the system which is supposed to be 80 percent effective in reducing
ballast discharge. The latter figure is probably high, however, due to the mixing action of
the ship rolling in a seaway. Sea Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Naviga-
tion of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Proposed Regulations Pro-
mulgated by the Coast Guard as Required by Title II of the "Ports and Waterwvays Safety
Act of 1972", 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-16, at 23-34 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Coast
Guard Hearingsj. Taking all the calculations discussed and applying them to the 1971
tonnage figures, it may be calculated that if the world's 50,000 non-tank vessels de-ballast
an average of six times a year, they generate 2,400,000 tons of oil pollution. Taking the
estimated 155,100,000 DWT of LOT equipped tankers and the 38,800,000 DWT of non-LOT
tankers, the following figures result:
Annual Tanker Operational Oil
Pollution in Metric tons
LOT equipped Non-l.OT
Deballasting 595,584 186,240
Tank Washing 992,640 310,400
Totals 1,588,224 tons 496,640 tons
A total of 20,084,864 tons of tanker operational pollution is yielded or 4,484,864 tons per year
for vessels of all types. This is much higher than is generally reported particularly for non-
tanker de-ballasting. See generally Hunter, supra note 42, at 40-43; OECD Study on Flags
of Convenience, 4 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 231, 237 (1973); SUN OIL Co., ANALYSIS OF WORID
TANK SHIP FLEET 1 (1972).
44. One source of confusion has been that tanker size, and hence potential for pollution,
may be expressed in traditional terms of gross registered tons (GRT or enclosed volume of
the vessel in tons of 100 cubic feet) or in deadweight tons (DWT or weight in long tons of
2,280 lbs. of water displaced by vessel empty and loaded). The first is the measure of internal
capacity by available cargo space, which was historically applied to freighters and other
vessels before the advent of the huge tankers and bulk-carriers. The second actually measures
the carrying capacity of the vessel in weight rather than volume and is therefore more accur-
ate when dealing with cargoes such as ore and oil which have a relatively constant relationship
between weight and volume occupied. The differences that may result by applying the two
standards may be appreciated when one realizes that the ratio of carrying capacity (DWT)
to internal volume (GRT) may vary from 1.5 or 2.7:1 (tankers of 100,000 GRT may actually
be 150,000 to 170,000 DWT). See generally A. KNIGHT, MODERN SEAMANSHIP 42-43 (13th ed.
1960); Healy & Paulsen, Marine Oil Pollution and the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, 1 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 537, 566 n.165 (1970); Meiklejohn, Liability for Oil Pollution
Clean-up and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 982 n.78
(1970).
45. Oil may be measured variously in short tons of 2,000 lbs., long tons of 2,240 lbs. or
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of oil spilled,4" but may result in the manipulation of figures to
minimize prevention efforts.47
II. TECHNICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF MARINE OIL POLLUTION
A. The Rise of the Supertanker
In spite of the lack of accurate figures as to whether oil pollution
is, in fact, on the increase, there has been growing concern in all
areas of the world community over the oil pollution threat. This
concern has been generated not only because of increasing sensitiv-
ity over ecological issues, but also by the boom in the maritime
transportation of oil with which such pollution has always been
associated. This maritime transport boom has been accompanied by
an attendant jump in tanker sizes which has increased the potential
environmental threat to staggering levels" as well as further compli-
cating the legal issues involved in preventing oil pollution.
The rise of the supertanker was largely the result of the 1967
closing of the Suez Canal by the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the size
metric tons of 2,204.6 lbs. The last measure is gaining wide acceptance. Oil is also frequently
measured in barrels of 42 US. gallons. The number of barrels/gallons in a ton varies from
240 to 308 gallons or roughly six to seven barrels depending on the temperature and density
of the particular oil and the ton measure employed. See Oil Pollution Clean-up, supra note
44, at 982 n.78.
46. An oil spill of 3,000 tons does not sound as terrible to the public as one of 21,400
barrels which does not sound nearly as traumatic as 900,000 gallons, although they all repre-
sent approximately the same quantity of oil. The 4,484,864 metric tons of oil pollution dis-
cussed in note 43 supra is certainly impressive even in those terms, but it also represents
roughtly 1.34 billion gallons of oil pollution and waste each year.
47. For example, although deadweight tonnage is a more accurate measure of a tanker's
capacity to cause oil spillage or ecological damage, industry interests have succeeded in
having their potential liability measured in the smaller terms of gross tonnage. See, e.g.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1321 (Supp. IV 1974) (limits clean-
up liability to $100 per gross ton); Article V of the International Convention on Civil Liability
of Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29, 1969, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT. 45 (1970) (limits the liability
of tanker owners to governments and private parties to 2,000 francs per ship's ton or an
aggregate not to exceed 210 million francs).
48. The following table gives some idea of the growth in size of tankers in the past 25
years. The table is adopted from Hearings Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries on H.R. 5091 and H.R. 5898, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-15, at 385, 387 (1973).
cargo cargo in relative
Year length in tons barrels draft shipping cost
195T) 679t) 30,000 225,000 35 100%
1960 750 50,000 375,000 38 88%
1970) 1150 250,000 1,875,000 65 45%
1975 1300 500,000 3,750,000 95 38%
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of tankers has grown steadily since World War II,11 as the demand
for oil kept pace with the burgeoning Western economies, the long
haul around the Cape of Good Hope from the Persian Gulf oil ports
to the United States and Europe, necessitated by the Suez closing,
made the use of supertankers an economic necessity. The economies
of scale afforded by such large vessels,5 which had already led to
the "jumboizing"' of many older tankers, became the controlling
factors in determining vessel size and virtually dictated the quan-
tum leaps in size which followed. Spurred by major breakthroughs
in shipbuilding technology and by a chronic tanker shortage, the
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC's) and Ultra Large Crude Car-
riers (ULCC's) 2 were soon being produced in ever increasing sizes
with seemingly no technological limit on how large they might be-
come.53 Indeed, the only controlling factor seemed to be the demand
for oil, which then showed few signs of diminishing.54
49. At the end of World War II, the T-2 tanker of 16,765 DWT was the mainstay of the
world tanker fleet and has been used as the standard of reference. In 1972, the average
deadweight tonnage of the world's tankers was 50,900 DWT or 3 T-2 equivalents. SUN OIL
Co., ANALYSIS OF WORLD TANK SHIP FLEET 5, 10 (1973).
50. As vessel size increases, relative building costs decrease from $75/ton for a 100,000
DWT tanker to $61/ton for a 326,000 DWT Bantry class tanker or approximately $20 million.
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/66 at 87-96 (1969). At the same time cargo capacity is radically in-
creased, operating costs increase only slightly and some expenses such as crew, quarters, etc.,
remain fixed. At the height of demand in the late 60's and early 70's a tanker could charge
freight rates of $20/ton with operating costs of $2.40/ton. Gross profits on a single voyage could
exceed $4.2 million. U.N. Doc. E/64/2/D.16 graph 1 (1966); see NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1970, at
94-96.
51. This refers to the process by which a conventional sized tanker was cut in half and a
large middle section attached between the two sections increasing its size and capacity by as
much as a factor of two.
52. The term VLCC describes tankers over 200,000 DWT, but less than 400,000 DWT,
while ULCC describes tankers in excess of 400,000 DWT. N. MOESTERT, SUPERSHIP 24 (1974).
53. A million ton tanker has been projected. Such a monster would be 1,640 feet long,
274 feet wide, and draw 100 feet of water. Anyone of her five main tanks could comfortably
hold any of Europe's major cathdrals. Id. at 23.
54. The demand for tankers led to massive speculation and overbuilding, which ulti-
mately caused a collapse of the tanker market in 1975 as the demand for oil dropped due to
energy conservation, oil price increases and the inflation/recession of Western economies. The
cost of a spot charter from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe fell from $8.8 million in
October 1973, at $2.6 million in November 1974, to as little as $800,000 in March 1975. As
hundreds of supertankers lay idle for want of cargoes, there was widespread cancellations of
new ship orders, and 168 tankers totalling 11.3 million DWT, some just launched, were laid
up to save operating and insurance costs. Some 90 million DWT or 30 percent of the fleet
was estimated to be surplus. The long-term effects of this development on the future use of
the supertanker and oil pollution is not yet known. Some experts predict a decrease in large
tankers and a bright future for multi-purpose, 100-200,000 DWT vessels which can enter some
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These same economies of scale were also responsible for the
creation of other types of "superships" ' such as bulk carriers, Liqui-
fled Natural Gas Carriers (LNGC's), and combination function ves-
sels, such as ore/oil or ore/bulk/oil (OBO) carriers.
While sharing the advantages of large tankers, such vessels also
shared many of the potential disadvantages affecting their potential
for traumatic pollution such as long stopping distances, large turn-
ing radii, and low shaft horsepower to tonnage ratios. Another major
difficulty is that these large vessels have appeared in maritime com-
merce so suddenly that few officers have had the opportunity to
become experienced with their handling, further increasing poten-
tial for traumatic pollution of epic proportions. '"
B. Legal Context of International Maritime Commerce
Efforts to prevent traumatic pollution are also complicated by
the very nature of international maritime commerce and the legal
context in which it exists. Practical considerations dictate that a
ship which visits many countries each year should not be subjected
to conflicting requirements as to construction and equipment by
each nation, but rather should be required to comply only with
uniform international standards. While efforts to arrive at such
standards have been going on for some time under the auspices of
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), '7 the progress of multilateral negotiations on issues involv-
United States ports as well as utilize the newly opened Suez Canal on the ballast portion of
their voyage. BUSINESS WEEK, June 23, 1975, at 56; id., Apr. 28, 1975, at 85-86; id., Nov. 9,
1974 at 63; TIME, Mar. 10, 1975 at 41.
55. A term made famous by Noel Moestert in his book Supership, supra note 52.
56. This is particularly true when dangerous cargoes are involved. In November, 1974,
the 93,723 DWT Yuyo Maru, a Liquified Natural Gas Carrier, could not turn quickly enough
to yield the right of way and collided with the freighter Pacific Ares in Tokyo Bay. The Yuyo
Maru blew up causing great loss of life and finally had to be sunk by gunfire and torpedoes
after resisting all attempts to extinguish her fires for 17 days. Miami Herald, Nov. 29, 1974,
at 28, col. 3; Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1974, at 15, col. 1.
57. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization [IMCO] was organized
by international convention in 1948 and came into being in 1958. Headquartered in London,
the organization is chiefly concerned with coordinating uniformity of regulation and coopera-
tion among its 88 members in regard to the technical and economic aspects of maritime
commerce. See generally Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Or-
ganization, in force Mar. 17, 1958, (1948) 9 U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48;
Mensah, The IMCO Experience, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 237 (J.
Hargrove ed. 1972); Johnson, IMCO: The First Four Years, (1959-1962) 12 INT'L CoMP. L.Q.
31 (1963); C. ALEXANDRAWICZ, WORLD ECONOMIC AGENCIES 157 (1962).
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ing such vital economic and environmental issues is glacial at best.
Many nations, frustrated by the political squabbling restrain-
ing such efforts, have moved unilaterally to protect their coasts."
However, even unilateral efforts are frequently frustrated by the
complex legal rules which govern the ability of a coastal nation to
regulate foreign vessels. The jurisdiction of a coastal state to pre-
scribe regulations for traumatic pollution prevention and to apply
them to foreign vessels"' is chiefly a function of the nature of the
waters in which the foreign vessel is located.
In internal waters,'" the foreign vessel is subject to total regula-
tion by the coastal state, subject only to certain principles of inter-
national comity involving purely domestic, internal matters of the
ship's management." A foreign vessel has no absolute right of entry
into a nation's internal waters, and the coastal state has the right
to require compliance with special navigation and pollution preven-
tion regulations as a condition of admission to internal waters. 2
As one proceeds seaward from internal waters, the jurisdiction
of the coastal state progressively diminishes. In the territorial sea
the coastal state has powers equivalent to full sovereignty," subject
only to the international right of innocent passage." Foreign vessels
engaged in innocent passage may be required to comply with rea-
58. Iran, for example, in 1973 asserted the right to board all vessels within 50 miles of
its coast for enforcement of pollution prevention regulations. SUPERSHIP, supra note 52, at 303.
Canada has unilaterally asserted broad jurisdiction both to proscribe certain polluting activi-
ties within the Arctic Circle and to ban certain vessels altogether as well as to establish
construction and equipment requirements. Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act of 1970,
CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (1st Supp. 1970). See also Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International
Law-A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 13 (1971).
59. The coastal state has plenary jurisdiction over its own vessels, and the persons
aboard them, to enforce pollution prevention regulations wherever in the world they may be.
United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933).
60. Internal waters are those waters on the land side of the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured. Art. 5, Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
in force Sept. 10, 1964, [19641 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
61. Generally, purely internal matters not affecting the peace of the coastal state are left
to flag state authorities. Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
62. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). Congress has expressly author-
ized the denial of entry into United States waters to foreign vessels which do not comply with
certain pollution prevention regulations. 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (Supp. IV 1974). Certain interna-
tional agreements also authorize signatories to deny entry to non-complying vessels of party
nations. See, e.g., 1971 Amendments to the Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, adopted Oct. 15, 1971, 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. (1972).
63. Territorial Sea Convention, note 60 supra, art. 1.
64. Id., art. 14(1).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sonable safety and navigation regulations and measures to protect
the security of the coastal state. "5 Measures designed to reduce ship
casualties and catastrophic traumatic pollution would certainly
seem to be within the ambit of such jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the
width of the territorial sea and thus the scope of such protective
jurisdiction is not settled under international law." Claims range
from 3 miles to as much as 200 miles, and the subject has great
strategic, political, and economic implications. If international
agreement is reached on a wider territorial sea, such as 12 miles, the
ability of coastal states to take preventive measures and protect
their coastlines will be greatly enhanced. "7
Beyond the territorial sea, the jurisdiction of the coastal state
is greatly reduced. A special agreement under a treaty of friendship,
commerce, and navigation with the flag-state of vessels frequently
visiting its ports, or some other special arrangement " would allow
the coastal state to exercise special preventive jurisdiction over for-
eign vessels beyond the territorial sea. Barring such an arrange-
ment, the coastal state enjoys only limited contiguous zone jurisdic-
tion extending 12 miles off its coast. 9 This jurisdiction is limited to
the enforcement of violations of the coastal state's fiscal, immigra-
tion, customs, and sanitary laws within the territorial sea. " The
commentary of the International Law Commission reveals that the
term "sanitary" was probably not intended to include anti-pollution
regulations as part of the contiguous zone jurisdiction; however, a
number of countries, including the United States, have adopted
such a stance based on the need for limited protective jurisdiction.7'
65. Id., art. 17.
66. The first U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 failed to reach agreement
on the breadth of the territorial sea. The Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea also
failed, narrowly, to arrive at an agreement. The Third U.N. Conference of the Sea, currently
in intersession, has agreement on this point as one of its highest priorities.
67. The United States has expressed a willingness to recognize a 12 mile breadth of the
territorial sea in exchange for agreement on the freedom of transit through international
straits. See Address by Henry A. Kissinger, American Bar Association Annual Convention,
Aug. 11, 1975.
68. An example is the series of so-called "Liquor Treaties," whereby flag states agreed
to United States enforcement jurisdiction for Prohibition over their vessels within one hour's
sailing time of the United States coast in exchange for the right to transit United States
Waters with liquor cargoes under seal. See, e.g., Treaty with Great Britain for Prevention of
Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, May 22, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. No. 685, 27 L.N.T.S.
182.
69. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 24.
70. Id.
71. See N. WULF, CONTIGUOUS ZONES FOR POLLUTION CONTROL: AN APPRAISAL UNDER INTER-
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Beyond the contiguous zone the jurisdiction of the coastal state
is even more limited. Aside from one international agreement which
allows the coastal states to move, under narrowly defined circum-
stances, against a foreign vessel on the high seas which threatens the
coastal state with imminent oil pollution," there is no jurisdiction
on the part of a coastal state for pollution prevention over foreign
vessels on the high seas under international law.
A vessel on the high seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of its flag state," which is charged with drawing up and enforcing
oil pollution prevention regulations for its vessels. 4 Unfortunately,
flag state high seas enforcement of oil pollution regulations is not
only haphazard, but some countries, known as "Flag of Convenience
nations," have undertaken to attract foreign tonnage to their regis-
try by a program of deliberate non-enforcement of international
shipping regulations. These nations not only control almost a fifth
of the world's tonnage of ships of all kinds but also control nearly a
third of tanker tonnage.
75
The existence of these so-called Flag of Convenience nations,
coupled with the doctrine of exclusive flag state jurisdiction over
vessels on the high seas, presents a tremendous obstacle to effective
high seas pollution prevention measures. In addition to allowing
large numbers of vessels to operate without effective controls, they
limit the enforcement efforts of concerned flag states since owners
faced with too stringent enforcement or requirements can simply
evade all controls by switching to a Flag of Convenience registry.
Since few nations wish to set a dangerous precedent for their
NATIONAL LAW 145 (1971); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1321 (b) (1), (3), (5) (Supp. II, 1973).
72. Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties, done Feb. 21, 1974, 13 INT'L LEG. MAT. 546 (1974).
73. Convention on the High Seas, Sept. 30, 1962, art. 6(1), [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
74. Id., art. 24; see e.g., Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Supp.
M, 1973).
75. "Flag of Convenience" nations may be generally described as those allowing owner-
ship and control of their vessels by non-nationals, coupled with easy access to their registry,
low taxes, and which lack the power, administrative machinery, and/or will to enforce inter-
national regulations. The chief "Flag of Convenience" nations are Liberia, Panama, Lebanon,
Cyprus, Somalia and Singapore, with Liberia accounting for 80 percent of tonnage. "Tax
Haven" countries such as Bermuda, The Bahamas, Gibraltar and the Netherlands Antilles
are distinguishable in that they fully enforce shipping regulations while offering considerable
tax advantages to vessels under their registry. See OECD Study on Flags of Convenience, 4
J. MARrIIME L. & COM. 231 (1974).
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own vessels by unilaterally attempting to assert jurisdiction over
foreign vessels on the high seas,7" the chief thrust of international
efforts has been to negotiate multilateral uniform standards which
will actively be enforced by all flag states. Such standards include
reciprocal inspection provisions in ports of the signatories. This
ideal, even if achieved however, may not prove successful without
the delegation of some flag state authority to a responsible interna-
tional body.
Many Flag of Convenience nations, such as Liberia, have grad-
ually attempted to apply some of the less burdensome international
regulations77 and personnel licensing provisions without success.
This lack of success is largely due both to the fact that their huge
fleets rarely, if ever, call at a national port and that these nations
lack the administrative and technical ability to carry out a global
enforcement program.7"
The combined effect of exclusive flag state jurisdiction and the
limitations imposed on coastal state pollution prevention jurisdic-
tion is to divide efforts designed to control traumatic oil pollution
and vessel casualties into two areas. The first area consists of those
measures which are best accomplished by international multilateral
efforts. These include efforts aimed at high seas pollution preven-
tion as well as those that primarily take effect aboard the vessel
itself. Included under the heading of international multilateral pre-
vention efforts are: (a) vessel construction and equipment require-
ments; (b) regulations for the prevention of collisions on the high
seas, including traffic separation schemes; and (c) officer and crew
training and certification requirements.
The second area consists of measures which may be properly
76. Efforts on the part of some nations to extend their territorial sea to 200 miles notwith-
standing. See also High Seas Convention supra note 73, art. 5(1); Volkenburg v. Nederland-
Amerik. Stoom v. Maats, 336 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1964); Advisory Opinion on the Constitution
of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation [19601 I.C.J. 149.
77. Such as the Safety of Life at Sea and Loadline Conventions. The International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, in force May 26, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S:
No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27, as amended (to which 90 nations are parties); The International
Convention on Load Lines, 1966, in force July 21, 1968, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331,
64 U.N.T.S. 133 (to which 70 nations are parties).
78. OECD Study, supra note 75, at 249-250. The major Flag of Convenience nations are,
however, attempting to meet hull and machinery certification requirements by delegating
their inspection duties to international classification societies such as Lloyd's. Liberia is also
a party to the 1954 Oil Pollution Prevention Convention, supra note 16.
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taken by the coastal state on a unilateral basis to exercise protective
prevention jurisdiction along its coast. Whenever possible, such
measures should attempt to conform to uniform standards to ease
the practical burdens of compliance. Measures which may be in-
cluded in this category of unilateral national traumatic pollution
prevention include: (a) aids to navigation and hydrographic sur-
veys; (b) pilotage; (c) vessel traffic systems; and (d) offshore deep-
water ports. Limited equipment requirements to the extent neces-
sary to comply with coastal state systems may also be imposed
where reasonable. 9
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT TRAUMATIC POLLUTION
A. Construction and Equipment Standards
The chief purpose for formulating construction standards is to
reduce structural failures and to minimize oil outflow when a ship's
hull is ruptured. Structural failures account for a significant
amount of high seas traumatic oil pollution" since rough seas are a
prime cause of such break-up. However, since such structural fail-
ures take place on the high seas, they are a relatively minor con-
tributor to coastal pollution.
The most effective methods of preventing structural failure,
whether due to age, poor design, or faulty workmanship, are precon-
struction certification of design blueprints, close inspection of the
building process, and periodic inspections after the hull is in service.
Distinctive problems are presented, however, when the coun-
tries of registry, ownership, and construction are different. Any na-
tion has the right to set construction standards as a condition of
granting registry,"1 but other nations may seek to influence con-
79. For example, a radio capable of communicating with coastal state authorities on
designated frequencies.
80. Structural failures may account for as much as 50 percent of all tanker traumatic
oil outflows. The chief cause of structural failure is the breakup in heavy seas of older ships,
averaging 17 years old, with a heavy representation of "Flag of Convenience" vessels. Exact
quantities of oil spilled in this manner are hard to estimate since the rough seas disperse the
oil quickly and there is little idea of how much oil remains trapped in the vessel. Each year's
winter storms on the Atlantic bring more reports of such breakups, such as the Liberian
tanker Spartan Lady which broke up and sank in high seas in April, 1975 after the Coast
Guard rescued her crew. As much as 500,000 gallons of oil may have escaped before she went
down. N.Y. Times, April 5, 1975, at 33, col. 1. See generally OIL OUTFLOws, supra note 40, at
6; EXXON OIL Co., REDUCING TANKER ACCIDENTS 5 (1973).
81. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(1).
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struction by virtue of their jurisdiction over the owner, 2 or over
the ship being built in their territory, thus placing the vessel under
conflicting standards.
Great progress had been made in formulating international de-
sign and construction standards under the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention in 1960, since such safety requirements were
a prime consideration before the emergence of concern over oil pol-
lution. Moreover, many of these problems had also been eased by
the emergence of a multibillion dollar maritime insurance industry.
Handling in excess of $2.5 billion in premiums per year, these com-
panies, through the utilization of international classification soci-
eties and direct economic pressure, exercise tremendous influence
on vessel construction and safety standards."
Construction standards may also be used to minimize oil out-
flow once a casualty, such as a grounding or collision, occurs through
such safeguards as reduced tank sizes and double bottoms.
The concept of limiting tank sizes in order to reduce the
amount of oil outflow has had universal appeal. However, there has
been less than universal agreement on the implementation of the
concept. The standard sought is an optimum point at which the
advantages of reduced tank size are still marginally greater than the
disadvantages of increased surface area and oil clingage s4 After
lengthy discussions, IMCO produced detailed regulations for reduc-
ing oil outflows utilizing their standard for tank size. 5 Through a
series of complicated formulae, center tanks " are limited to 50,000
cubic meters, wing tanks"7 to 30,000 cubic meters, and other tanks
82. For example, Greek, United States, and Italian interests own about 70 percent of
Flag of Convenience tonnage with the remaining ownership scattered throughout the world,
often under the guise of dummy corporations. OECD Study, supra note 75, at 239.
83. Handley, The Role of the Marine Insurance Industry in the Emerging Regime of the
Oceans, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEAN 285 (J. Gamble & G.
Pontecorvo eds. 1973).
84. Increased surface area increases potential operational pollution due to deballasting
and tank washing.
85. The tank size, and therefore the maximum amount of oil outflow which could result
from the tank being pierced, was limited to either 400 times the cube root of the deadweight
tonnage or 30,000 cubic meters, whichever is greater, but no more than 40,000 cubic meters.
1973 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 11, ch. InI, Annex I.
Compare the limits proposed by industry: 500 multiplied by the cube root of the deadweight
tonnage. TANKER ACCIDENTS, supra note 80, at 14. See generally, Price, Anti-Pollution Mea-
sures: IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment, 8 MARINE TECH. 1, 7 (1971).
86. Those tanks located inboard of a protective longitudinal bulkhead.
87. Those tanks which are against the outer skin of the vessel.
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to 40,000 cubic meters (with some variations allowed to compensate
for space occupied by segregated ballast tanks).
The installation of double bottoms"5 is aimed at reducing oil
outflow from tanks damaged by groundings 9 and has attracted
much controversy regarding safety, practicality, and necessity. The
controversy over the installation of double bottoms reached a cres-
cendo when Congress passed the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
of 19720 which, for the first time, gave the Coast Guard broad regu-
latory powers to establish vessel design criteria based on marine
environmental protection." This act also included the power to es-
tablish standards for foreign ships entering United States waters
and to deny entry for noncompliance." Implicit in this regulatory
grant, but not expressly required, was the power to require double
bottoms on future tankers. Under this authority, the Coast Guard
proposed a 100 percent double bottom requirement on all future
construction of any tankers of appreciable size built or registered in
the United States. This proposal touched off a vigorous debate even-
tually culminating in Congressional hearings on the Coast Guard's
proposed regulations. 3 Various authorities asserted that such a
requirement would result in a reduction of from 50 to 90 percent of
tanker bottom damage oil outflow. 4 While environmentalists were
88. A double bottom is simply an additional layer of plating over the submerged part of
the hull with a void space between the outer and inner hulls. In theory, most impacts will
pierce only the outer hull and oil will be kept inside the tank, with flooding confined to the
void space.
89. Groundings account for approximately 26 percent of all tanker casualties and 29
percent of traumatic oil outflow. Porricelli, supra note 15, at 4; OIL OurFLOWS, supra note 40,
at 6.
90. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973). See generally Davis, The Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972: An Extension of the Federal Approach to Oil Pollution, 6 J.
MARITIME L. & CoM. 249 (1975).
91. While the Coast Guard has always had broad regulatory powers over vessel construc-
tion and equipment, the criteria had primarily been based on the safety of life and property.
See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 160 (1975).
92. 46 U.S.C. §§ 391(a)(2),(13) (Supp. III, 1973). This power to establish construction
standards for foreign vessels has never been used and is contrary to the official United States
position, which seeks to attain uniform international standards through multilateral negotia-
tion. It was included, however, so as not to hamper United States tankers competitively since
most oil entering the United States is carried in foreign tankers. See infra note 99.
93. See Coast Guard Hearings, supra note 43; 38 FED. REG. 2167 (1973); 38 FED. REG.
17848 (1973).
94. Coast Guard Hearings, supra note 43, at 23-24; S. REP. No. 92-724, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2897 (1972). See also Legislative History, Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2766 (1972) [hereinafter cited as VTS Legislative History].
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delighted by the Coast Guard proposal, American ship builders and
oil companies rose up in arms. They charged that such regulations
would have adverse effects on tanker stability and buoyancy due to
increased floodable space,95 as well as increased building costs (10
percent, or as much as $7.5 million) with parallel increases in freight
rates (8 percent), all for what builders considered a minimal bene-
fit. " The most damning argument against double bottoms, however,
was that this would cause increased economic disadvantage to
American shipbuilders, who were finally starting to get contracts to
build Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC's), 7 because such a require-
ment would drive buyers to other nations. It was further argued that
United States waters would not really benefit from such a require-
ment since most oil entering this country is carried in small foreign
tankers. 8 This is because the VLCC's, at which the double bottom
requirement was primarily aimed, draw too much water to enter the
major United States ports. Moreover, the State Department
strongly counseled against unilateral enforcement of the double bot-
tom requirement for smaller tankers in order to avoid reprisals and
to preserve the United States' negotiating position in talks on
similar multilateral standards. Finally, it was argued that double
bottoms might well be unnecessary in the future since supertankers
would probably never enter dangerous coastal waters but would
95. TANKER ACCIDENTS, supra note 80, at 14. This argument ignores the fact that double
bottoms could be used for segregated clean ballast water and therefore would not be floodable.
96. Hang-Sheng, Incrementing Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Segregated Ballasting
Reducing Oil Pollution of the Sea, in SOCIAL IMPACTS, supra note 27, at 89, 93. A shipping
industry cost/benefit analysis of double bottoms appears in Coast Guard Hearings, supra note
43, at 111-153. Industry groups, perhaps to forestall stricter governmental measures and to
provide for self insurance, have created a number of devices to aid the fight against pollution.
Notable among these are the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for
Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), Jan. 7, 1969, 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 497 (1969) and Contract Regarding
an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), Jan. 14, 1971, 10
INT'L LEG. MAT. 137 (1971). See generally Becker, A Short Cruise on the Good Ships TO-
VALOP and CRISTAL, 5 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 609 (1974). Their motives may be suspect
since the "Load on Top" (LOT) system was known to the industry for many years before it
was adopted as a "new innovation" after a growing outcry against oil pollution and a showing
that it was actually economically advantageous. Hunter, supra note 42, at 53.
97. See supra note 52.
98. American vessels currently carry between 5 and 15 percent of the oil imported into
the United States. Because of the shallowness of the United States harbors only small tankers
may be used and these usually are equipped with double bottoms anyway. VTS Legislative
History, supra note 94, at 2768; Hearings on S. 2089 and H.R. 8193 Before the Subcomm. on
Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-81, at 26
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Energy Hearings].
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operate exclusively at offshore deepwater ports?9
In view of these arguments, the Coast Guard elected to attempt
to implement the double bottom requirement through multilateral
international negotiations. The 1973 Convention on Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea from Ships encouraged double bottoms but did
not require them.'""
In addition to construction standards aimed at new vessels,
various attempts have also been made to require vessels of all types
and ages to carry equipment designed to improve vessel safety.
While it is easier for a vessel in international commerce to add some
equipment to its inventory than to alter its basic construction, there
is clearly a need for uniformity and flexibility in the type, amount,
and specifications of required equipment in order to prevent waste-
ful and burdensome multiplicity.
There seems no doubt that a nation can establish reasonable
equipment requirements for a vessel seeking entry into its internal
waters.'"' Similarly, a flag state has jurisdiction to require equip-
ment on vessels of its registry.'"' Less clear, however, is the right of
a coastal state to require equipment on a vessel which is in innocent
passage through its territorial sea or international strait. While
coastal states may implement laws and regulations relating to
transport and navigation which must be obeyed by vessels in inno-
cent passage,' 3 a requirement beyond the minimum basic equip-
ment (e.g., lights which are universally recognized as necessary to
prevent chaos) would probably exceed the authority of the coastal
state, amounting to an unreasonable interference with the right of
innocent passage and the sovereignty of the flag state. The Com-
mentary of the International Law Commission fails to disclose
authority to require even such basic equipment, but few nations
would contest the coastal state's implicit right to protect itself
99. See discussion supra, at notes 48-62, on the future of deepwater ports for supertank-
ers located offshore in safe waters.
100. See the 1973 Convention, supra note 11 ch. Ill, annex I, reg. 23(5). The Convention
also mentions another alternative to double bottoms; the use of emergency high suction cargo
transfer pumps to remove oil from ruptured bottom tanks to ballast tanks or portable blad-
ders before any appreciable amounts of oil can escape.
101. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 16(2); Payne v. S.S. Tropic Breeze,
423 F.2d 236 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970).
102. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(1).
103. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 17.
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against the passage through its waters of an obviously hazardous
vessel. 0
The types of equipment requirements concerned with trau-
matic pollution prevention are chiefly directed at the ship's capabil-
ity to navigate and maneuver. Groundings normally result from not
knowing where the dangers are located. Collisions, on the other
hand, are primarily connected with the vessel's ability to maneuver.
Modern technology has developed a bewildering array of devices
available to the mariner, some of which are so basic to the design
of the vessel as to border on construction requirements.
Navigation has been greatly improved by a number of sophisti-
cated electronic devices such as radar, direction finders, gyrocom-
passes, and fathometers. Other electronic position locating devices
are known as LORAN, and Navigation Satellites (NAVSAT). Since
this equipment, expensive as it is, represents potentially a great
benefit for a small cost (relative to the cost of a new vessel) most
vessels have at least the more conventional items of equipment.
The influence of the marine insurance underwriters in requiring
such equipment has been significant. Also under consideration for
future prevention equipment requirements are such exotic devices
as sonar doppler docking systems,'"5 low velocity measuring sys-
tems, television cameras to increase visibility, armor blisters on
vulnerable parts of the hull, remote release stemhead anchors to
avoid the bulbous speed bows of modern tankers, stern anchors, and
sensitive instruments to accurately determine the constantly chang-
ing drafts at bow, midships, and stern.'
While such equipment properly maintained and operated can
prevent most groundings, collisions are presently prevented by
"rules of the road" and equipment affecting the maneuverability of
the tanker. 7 The tenfold increase in tanker size without a corre-
104. See 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 16, at 386-96 (1965).
105. TANKER ACCIDENTS, supra note 80, at 9. Sonar doppler docking systems use sound
wave frequency changes to gauge the location of and rate of approach to piers and docks.
106. Swift, Touhill, Templeton & Roseman, Oil Spillage Prevention, Control and Resto-
ration: State of the Art and Research Needs, in OIL POLLUTION: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 31,
52-54 (J. Degler ed. 1964).
107. Collisions account for between 25 and 30 percent of all tanker traumatic polluting
incidents. The vast majority occur within the ecologically fragile coastal zone (particularly
within harbors and around harbor entrances where crowded traffic lanes and slow speeds
decrease maneuverability). Porricelli, supra note 15, at 4; OIL OUTFLOWS, supra note 40, at 5.
"Rules of the Road" are discussed in the text accompanying note 131 infra.
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sponding increase in power over the past 20 years, 08 has adversely
affected the stopping distance of modern tankers.' 9 This handicap,
coupled with tremendous momentum, large turning radii, and vir-
tual uncontrollability at speeds of less than 4 to 5 knots, has made
the avoidance of damage producing collisions very difficult."0
Proposals"' to overcome these manuevering problems have
been criticized as being inordinately expensive, while reducing stop-
ping distance only 20 percent or the equivalent of a speed reduction
from 16 to 14 knots. Industry spokesmen have proposed instead a
series of special maneuvers involving repeated shifting of the rudder
with stepped reductions in speed which they claim will produce
better results."' The effect of such maneuvers in a collision situa-
tion, where everything depends on each master knowing what the
other is doing, remains to be seen.
The importance that each ship know what the other is doing
suggests one United States equipment requirement which should be
adopted internationally-vessel bridge to bridge radio-telephones.
Despite rules for the prevention of collisions and vessel traffic sepa-
ration systems,"I3 a great many collisions have occurred which could
have been prevented if the masters had been able to communicate
with each other."4 Traditional methods of communication such as
108. Hunter, supra note 42, at 38.
109. From full ahead to stop, a 25,000 to 77,000 DWT tanker requires 81/2 to 9 minutes
when backing with a single screw, steam turbine plant. A 144,000 DWT tanker requires 10
'/2 ship's lengths and 11 minutes. The time and distance required to stop increase proportion-
ately with vessel speed and size (momentum) as a function of the shaft horsepower and
propeller blade size and number available to brake. Oil Spillage Prevention, supra note 106,
at 49. The 30,000 H.P. main propulsion plant of the average 250,000 DWT tanker is equivalent
to a 1/3 H.P. engine on a 40 foot boat and such an arrangement is, in fact, used in a
miniaturized shiphandling course for supertanker masters at Grenoble, France. VTS Legisla-
tive History, supra note 94, at 2778.
110. See SUPERSHIP, supra note 52, at 29-38.
111. Recommended solutions include multiple screw, reversible pitch diesel propulsion
plants, pop-out brake flaps on the rudder or hull similar to jet aircraft speed brakes or landing
parachutes, and bow and side thrusters for alongside maneuvering. Generally, diesel plants
are more effective than steam for stopping power, the former giving full power astern, while
the latter is limited to 40 percent of the ahead power (50 percent of the RPM's and 80 percent
of the torque). Oil Spillage Prevention, supra note 106, at 49. See also Hunter, supra note
42, at 38; TANKER ACCIDENTS, supra note 80, at 9-11.
112. TANKER ACCIDENTS, supra note 80, at 11.
113. See text accompanying notes 131 and 142 infra.
114. For example, a Coast Guard study of collisions in the United States from 1965 to
1969 revealed 309 collisions involving 618 vessels, 115 deaths, $20 million in property damage,
and substantial ecological damage. Most of these could have been prevented by good commu-
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flashing lights, signal flags, whistle signals or radio morse are inade-
quate because they are too slow and cumbersome and because few
people today know how to properly use them. The success of the
United States Bridge to Bridge Radiotelephone Act,"5 administered
by the Coast Guard in conjunction with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, in reducing collisions indicates that the adoption
of an international bridge to bridge radiotelephone convention
would also result in a reduction of collisions."' Such a convention,
accompanied by an annex containing an international radio tele-
phone code, allowing persons of different languages to communi-
cate," 7 would require all vessels over a certain size to possess a
radiotelephone operable within certain range and frequency speci-
fications and to maintain a continuous live listening watch.
The effect of the United States Bridge to Bridge Radiotele-
phone Act on foreign vessels in American waters, however, is not
clear. The Act requires radiotelephones on "all vessels" of a certain
size"' without regard to nationality, but is silent as to whether it
expressly applies to foreign vessels." 9 The intention of Congress to
reduce vessel collisions through the use of bridge to bridge2 ' com-
munications strongly suggests an interpretation requiring that all
such vessels in American waters, not merely engaged in innocent
passage, comply with the Act. This Congressional intent would be
severely hampered if the large numbers of foreign vessels plying
United States waters were free from this requirement. Such a re-
nications. Two notable examples are the collisions of the Andrea Doria with the Stockholm
and the Arizona Standard/Oregon Standard collision. In each case there was radar contact,
but an inability to communicate when one vessel became aware that a dangerous situation
was evolving. See generally Legislative History of the Vessel Bridge to Bridge Radiotelephone
Act, 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1237; Bridge to Bridge Radiotelephone Regulations,
33 C.F.R. § 26 (1975).
115. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973).
116. The Coast Guard reports a 10 percent reduction overall of collisions with Bridge to
Bridge Radiotelephones with an 80 percent reduction in open water areas where there is time
to see, communicate, and maneuver. U.S. COAST GUARD, VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS ISSUE
STUDY: VOLUME I-ExEcUTIVE SUMMARY 12 (1973).
117. An international radiotelephone code, similar to the present International Code of
Signals, would allow two masters speaking different languages to communicate using a
standard word code with the key printed in their respective languages.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 11, 1973).
119. Legislative History of the Bridge Radiotelephone Act, supra note 114, is also silent
as to whether it was intended to apply to foreign vessels.




quirement would be a reasonable one, causing only minimal ex-
pense, and should thus be acceptable under both international",
and domestic law.
1 22
It is not enough, however, to merely promulgate adequate inter-
national standards of construction and requirements of navigation
and communications equipment. A number of traumatic incidents
have revealed that navigation equipment already installed on ves-
sels in compliance with insurance and other requirements is not
properly maintained.2 3 Similarly, the most comprehensive con-
struction standards will accomplish little if the nation having juris-
diction to enforce them lacks the capability to do so.'12 If the pro-
mulgation of multilateral uniform international construction stan-
dards and equipment requirements is to be effective, the smaller
nations of the world, particularly the Flag of Convenience nations,
must receive technological and administrative assistance 21 in build-
ing high caliber shipping inspection systems to enforce these stan-
dards. The most effective way to achieve a system such as those
presently maintained by the United States and the United King-
dom, would be through an International Maritime Administration
Bureau (IMAB) under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization (IMCO). Such an organization
would provide training and assistance to nations desiring to set up
an effective administration, or fulfill that role in situations where
the flag state cannot. A global system of resident inspectors sta-
tioned at the world's major ports, backed by a staff of experts for
examination of blueprints, etc., would ensure that all vessels would
be subject to effective administrative control either by the flag
state, as required by present international law,' 21 or by IMAB by
121. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 16(2).
122. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
123. A number of Liberian vessels have been discovered, after having gone aground, to
have had inoperative radar. The Liberian tanker Arrow went aground causing a massive spill
in Nova Scotia; she too had inoperative radar. Other equipment deficiencies discovered on
grounded Liberian vessels have included inoperative or malfunctioning radios, gyro com-
passes, running lights, depth finders, and radio direction finders. See Hunter, supra note 42,
at 36; SUPERSHIP, supra note 52, at 59-61.
124. Inspecting the construction of a 350,000 DWT supertanker means examining
3,000,000 square feet of plating and 257 miles of riveting. Such a job requires years of educa-
tion and experience if it is to be done properly. SUPERSHIP, supra note 52, at 74-77.
125. See Brown & Couper, Future Shipping and Transport Technology and Its Impact
on the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 271, 273 (1975).
126. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(1).
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delegation from the flag state.
The simultaneous utilization of existing national resident
inspector systems would minimize economic and practical difficul-
ties. Such inspectors should be given authority to delay the sailing
of a vessel until essential requirements are met, equipment is made
operable, or other unsafe conditions are corrected, so that compli-
ance is assured.
B. Collision Regulation and Traffic Separation
Although the proper construction and equipping of a vessel to
control oil outflow when damage has occurred are important in pre-
venting traumatic oil pollution, regulations for the conduct of ves-
sels with respect to other traffic on the high seas are equally impor-
tant since they lead to the reduction of collisions in the first place.
These "rules of the road," as they are commonly called, are designed
to give masters a standard of conduct to avoid collisions and
through which they can hopefully rely on other vessels to behave in
an expected manner. These rules are primarily rules of maneuver-
ing, although they also cover lights, shapes, and signals which must
be displayed in different situations so that vessels may detect each
other's presence and ascertain what the other is doing.2
These rules were first adopted on a national basis in the early
nineteenth century when both steam and sailing ships were small
and slow. They originally evolved as standards of care adopted by
admiralty courts to determine liability in collision cases. 2' Later,
national legislation was adopted by many nations requiring compli-
ance, but the question arose as to whether vessels were bound by
these statutes on the high seas and what rules should be applied in
collisions involving vessels of differing nationalities. Eventually, it
was held that the "rules of the road" had been adopted into the
customary law of the sea and were binding on all vessels on the high
127. The rules chiefly govern the status of one vessel. As privileged, it must maintain
its course and speed, and the other vessel, as burdened, must keep out of the way of the
privileged vessel. Which vessel is burdened and which is privileged depends on the type of
vessel, the activity engaged in and the relative positions of the vessels. Lights, shapes, and
whistle signals aid in ascertaining what the controlling parameters are. Signals are also used
to communicate presence in fog, course changes, and danger. One problem that arises in
multivessel situations is where a vessel is simultaneously required to maintain course and
speed with respect to one vessel yet also keep out of the way of another. See 33 U.S.C. §§
1062-1090 (1970).
128. See, e.g., The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
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seas.'29 A series of international conventions codified these rules.
The most recent codification is the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960.13°
The rules have been criticized as being outdated and ineffective
under today's conditions of huge, fast ships and overcrowded sea-
lanes. Moreover, the rules are based on avoidance of responsibility
for collision and give little guidance as to the proper action to take
once the risk of collision becomes imminent other than to keep out
of the way and avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.' 3' The rules
are also based on a two vessel situation and progressively fail as a
guideline upon the involvement of more vessels.' Finally, they fail
to take into account the lack of maneuverability of huge, deep-draft
superships which frequently cannot fulfill the obligations which
these rules impose upon them.
These criticisms resulted in the adoption of more modern rules
by IMCO in 1972, which are scheduled to possibly go into effect in
January 1977. 33 These rules include provisions on the use of radar,' 3
traffic separation schemes,' 35 vessels with deep drafts and limited
maneuverability,' 3 and nondisplacement craft, such as a hover-
craft.131
While these rules should prove extremely beneficial in overcom-
ing the present inadequacies, further measures are necessary to re-
duce the number of possible collision situations. One of the most
promising methods is the use of vessel traffic separation schemes,
which are systems whereby all traffic headed in a given direction is
routed through one corridor and traffic in the opposite direction
through another corridor with as much physical separation between
them as is practical. They are of the greatest value when used on
major shipping lanes,'38 harbor entrances and international straits.
129. The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 188 (1871).
130. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
March 24, 1964 [1965] 1 U.S.T., 794 T.I.A.S. No. 5813; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (1970);
U.S. COAST GUARD, RULES OF THE ROAD (C.G. Pub. No. 169, 1975).
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
132. Hunter, supra note 42, at 34 n.48.
133. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972,
done Oct. 30, 1972 as discussed in Lettow, The Control of Marine Pollution, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (E. Dolgin, T. Guilbert, eds. 1974).
134. Rules 6(b) & 7(b), Warbick, The Regulation of Navigation, in 3 NEW DIRECTION IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 137, 139 (S. Lay ed. 1973).
135. Id., Rule 10.
136. Id., Rules 3(b), 3(g).
137. Id., Rule 3(a).
138. For example, the North Atlantic Track Agreement provided for the separation of
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A large number of traffic separation schemes have been adopted
throughout the world, but they have produced mixed results,'39
largely because of the lack of sufficient enforcement jurisdiction to
ensure compliance with routing plans. " " Although a coastal state
has jurisdiction to enforce such schemes within the relatively narrow
band of its coastal waters and to require compliance with any sys-
tem by its flag vessels, there is at present no jurisdiction to force
compliance by foreign vessels on the high seas shipping lanes and
straits where the need for vessel traffic separation is often the great-
est.
The only international body with the necessary competence
and authority to deal with such a scheme is IMCO. Coastal states
wishing to establish traffic separation systems on the high seas off
their coasts presently must submit the plan to IMCO which, after
approval, will promulgate the plan. IMCO, however, cannot give
such plans legal force, but can merely publish them as recommen-
dations and invite countries to advise their ships to comply. Re-
cently, however, IMCO adopted a resolution encouraging member
states to make it an offense for their ships to proceed against the
traffic flow.' 4 ' Further compliance with traffic separation plans will
be assured under the new collision rules adopted in 1972 which will
obligate the parties to adopt legislation making it compulsory for
their ships to obey the rules for traffic separation schemes embodied
in the convention.' This may not be enough to ensure compliance
by nonparty state vessels or vessels of nonenforcing party states.
Without total enforcement of high seas traffic systems by coastal
states, flag states, or an international body, (which does not seem
the major east/west shipping lanes of the Atlantic. The Swedish liner Stockholm and the
Italian liner Andrea Doria (neither nation was a signatory to the agreement) collided while
on exact reciprocal courses which such a scheme was designed to avoid. Warbick, supra note
134, at 150 n.30.
139. A traffic separation scheme in the English Channel has reduced collisions as much
as 60 percent in some circumstances. It has been found particularly effective on foggy days
when vessels are reluctant to go against the flow of traffic. Beattie, Two Years of Routing in
the Dover Strait, 22 J. INST. NAVIGATION 442, 446 (1969); Calvert, Human Factors and the
Collision Problem, 22 J. INST. NAVIGATION 48 (1969). For a listing on systems presently in
operation, with diagrams see IMCO, SHIP's ROUTING AND TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEMES (1971).
140. If as few as 10 percent of the vessels fail to comply with the separation plan, its
effectiveness is severely diminished. Comment, The Establishment of Mandatory Sealanes
by Unilateral Action, 22 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 108, 109 (1972).
141. Brown & Couper, supra note 125, at 288-89.
142. Id., at 291.
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likely in the foreseeable future) the success of vessel traffic schemes
may well depend on a mutual enforcement effort by the admiralty
courts and marine insurance underwriters.
Frequently, where moral persuasion or force of law is not
enough to ensure compliance, economic penalties in the form of
adverse judgments, loss of insurance coverage, or high premiums
will provide the necessary incentive. One method of accomplishing
this would be for the world's admiralty courts to adopt the rule of
The Pennsylvania'43 for areas where an IMCO traffic scheme is in
effect. This rule, long followed by United States courts, would im-
pose automatic liability on a vessel which becomes involved in a
collision while it is not complying with a traffic separation plan,
regardless of the fault of the other vessel, which may or may not
share the damages.' This, in turn, would lead insurance companies
to revise their premiums to encourage compliance with such plans
by penalizing vessels registered in nonenforcing nations. Ideally,
insurance underwriters could write a term in their policies reducing
coverage or invoking a high deductible when the insured vessel does
not comply with a duly promulgated traffic separation plan. Flag
states could also encourage compliance by revising their limitation
of liability statutes4 ' to require a higher limitation in the event of
noncompliance.
The use of such economic incentives coupled with international
and domestic legal measures'46 should go a long way toward ensuring
143. The rule provides that a vessel that is involved in a collision while it is in violation
of a statutory safety rule is presumed to be at fault and therefore liable for at least part of
the damages, unless it can prove that the violation could in no way have caused the collision.
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873). See also Brown & Root Marine Operators,
Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1967); J.F. Campbell Co. v. Dick (The
Victor), 153 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1946).
144. Previously, under the United States rule of The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854), where both vessels were at fault, the damages were evenly
divided without regard to their relative degrees of fault. This rule was recently overturned
when the Supreme Court adopted a comparative negligence damage apportionment rule for
collision cases. United States Reliable Transfer Corp., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). The effect of this
decision on the rule of the Pennsylvania is not yet clear.
145. Under such statutes, a shipowner without privity is allowed under certain circum-
stances to limit his liability for damage caused by his ship to the value of his interest in the
vessel after the incident. See, e.g., The Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 181 et seq. (1970).
146. An alternative measure might be the use of treaties of friendship, commerce and
navigation to allow the coastal state to exercise vessel traffic separation system enforcement
authority over party state vessels. A. MANNING, THE ROLE OF COMPULSORY SEALANES IN RESOLV-
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the effectiveness of vessel traffic separation schemes on the high
seas, in areas of high traffic density, and in converging shipping
lanes. "'
Despite arguments that such traffic systems are an infringe-
ment on the freedom of navigation, it must be pointed out that such
high seas freedoms should be exercised with reasonable regard for
the safety of others, and for the prevention of traumatic oil pollu-
tion. 11 In this manner, vessel traffic separation rules may be consid-
ered analagous to other customary rules of the law of the sea which
do not act "to limit or restrict the freedom of the high seas, but to
safeguard its exercise in the interests of the entire international
community."" 9
C. Training and Certification Requirements
Regardless of all the construction standards, modern equip-
ment, inspections, collision regulations and vessel separation
schemes, the conduct of the vessel ultimately depends upon the
ability of the men who man her, for it is they who must operate
equipment, navigate the vessel, and avoid collisions and ground-
ings. The combination of all the technical requirements and preven-
tive rules discussed above, when coupled with a competent, well-
trained crew, should prevent all but the most unforseeable or uncon-
trollable types of traumatic pollution incidents. Unfortunately, it is
this last element which is too often lacking and prevents the attain-
ment of effective traumatic pollution prevention.
This lack of competent officers and crews is the result of a
number of factors. With the world's merchant fleet doubling every
8 to 10 years,' 0 the shortage of competent officers and union de-
mands for higher wages have encouraged cost-cutting owners to hire
ING MULTIPLE USE IN CONFLICT IN THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (U.S. Coast Guard Report, 1971); 1
HACKWORTH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 678 (1940).
147. Similar efforts to separate shipping and oil rigs, through the use of designated
fairways reserved for vessels, has already been successful in the Gulf of Mexico. See, e.g.,
Legg, Fairways Regulations: Jurisdiction and Effect, 26 J.A.G.J. 205 (1972); Knight,
Shipping Safety Fairways: Conflict Amelioration in the Gulf of Mexico, 1 J. MARITIME L. &
CoM. 1 (1969); 33 C.F.R. § 209.135 et seq. (1975).
148. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 2.
149. See Commentary of the International Law Commission on Article 2 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas, Francois, Report of the International Law Commission, [19561 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 278, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
150. Bates & Yost, supra note 9, at 253.
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less expensive and less competent personnel. Another factor has
been the rapid increase in vessel size which has often resulted in
huge vessels being placed in the hands of men with little or no
experience in handling them. Moreover, there has also been a failure
on the part of Flag of Convenience nations to exercise effective
control over the licensing of the flag-vessel officers.
With 1 in 14 ships involved in collisions each year, there is
widespread agreement that the deficiencies in seamanship and pro-
ficiency in the required navigational and shiphandling skills among
ships' officers is becoming one of the primary focuses of the Flag of
Convenience controversy. 5' Liberia, for example, has experienced
particular difficulties in supervising its ships' officers, despite the
existence of a licensing system. The deficiencies of the Liberian
maritime administration were pointedly brought to the world's at-
tention by the October, 1970 collision between the two Liberian
supertankers Allegro and Pacific Glory. After this disaster, which
caused considerable pollution and loss of life,'52 it was discovered
that three of the Pacific Glory's officers and four of the Allegro's
officers did not possess the required Liberian certificate of compe-
tency, while the officer on watch aboard the Allegro had no certifi-
cate at all. Subsequent experience with other Liberian vessels has
shown that this is not an unusual situation. 5 ' In fact, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) reports that as many as 50 percent
of Liberian officers do not possess the required Liberian license, and
there is a widespread use of forged mariners' documents.'
International efforts to achieve uniformity of standards for
training and licensing have experienced a regrettable lack of suc-
cess. The airline industry, although starting with a miserable safety
record in its early years, has reached great heights in implementing
international safety and licensing standards as a result of its relative
151. Warbick, supra note 134, at 141-42.
152. Approximately 80,000 gallons of oil were spilled with clean-up costs of $3,000,000.
Fourteen lives were lost in addition to severe damage to both vessels. OECD Study, supra
note 75, at 250.
153. The Liberian tanker Arrow ran aground causing a massive spill. The officer on
watch had no license. The Liberian supertankers Texanita and Oswego Guardian collided in
1972, sinking the former and taking 34 lives. No efforts to plot the other vessel on radar had
been made; both vessels were travelling at high speeds in dense fog and the master of the
Oswego Guardian fled from the scene at full speed without giving aid to the survivors of the
Texanita as required, and after transmitting an erroneous position. Both masters were subse-
quently disciplined by Liberia. SUPERSHIP, supra note 52, at 59-63.
154. OECD Study, supra note 75, at 250.
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newness and concern over its human cargoes, but the ancient sys-
tem of shipping personnel regulation has not yet awakened to the
fact that modern vessels are capable of dealing death and destruc-
tion on as massive a scale as the airplane. International bodies such
as the ILO have concerned themselves with safety, but chiefly from
the point of view of providing a safe, habitable vessel for the crew
and not to prevent traumatic incidents per se. 55 There is a growing
awareness, however, of the need for quick action to promote interna-
tional standards of training and certification.'
The need for international standards was first recognized in
1926 when the Turkish master of the Boykourt, in collision with the
French vessel Lotus, was found to have no certificate of compe-
tency. 7 The international response over the next 3 decades was
limited, however, to the adoption of two international conventions
setting only the vaguest and most general of standards. Even such
broad guidelines were rejected by most nations and only a few have
ratified the conventions.'58 More recently, IMCO has announced
plans to undertake action in this area and hopes to produce a con-
vention in 1977 dealing with the minimum required qualifications
and certification of officers and crews as well as providing technolog-
ical assistance to developing nations in maritime administration. 5 ,
International standards should include a system of global noti-
fication to all employers and maritime administrators of those per-
sonnel who have had their "tickets" lifted for incompetence. Mod-
ern technology and identification systems should be employed to
produce a certificate which is not susceptible to forgery or use by
persons other than the issuee. The possession of such a certificate
issued by a party-state to maritime personnel should be considered
155. See Seven Maritime Sessions of the International Labour Conference, 78 INT'L
LABOUR REV. 429 (1958); Argiroffo, Flags of Convenience and Substandard Vessels, 110 INT'L
LABOUR REV. 437 (1974).
156. Hunter, supra note 42, at 37 n.75.
157. Seven Maritime Sessions of the International Labour Conference, 78 INT'L LABOUR
REV. 429, 444-5 (1958).
158. These conventions are: Convention Concerning the Certification of Able Seamen,
June 29, 1946, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 605, T.I.A.S. No. 2949, 94 U.N.T.S. 11 (adopted by 18
countries including the United Kingdom, United States and Panama); Convention Concern-
ing the Minimum Requirements of Professional Capacity for Masters and the Officers on
Board Merchant Ships of Oct. 24, 1936, 54 Stat. 1683, T.S. 950, 3 BEVANS 281, 40 U.N.T.S.
153 (adopted by 25 nations including the United States, Liberia, France, Norway, Panama,
Denmark and Italy). See also 46 U.S.C. § 224 (a) (1970).
159. Brown & Couper, supra note 125, at 273.
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prima facie evidence of competence, and the present provision lim-
iting revocation powers to the issuing state should be retained. How-
ever, port officials of all states should be empowered to inspect for
such certificates and deny sailing clearance if the requisite mini-
mum number of officers necessary to maintain a safe watch are not
possessed of such a certificate.'"" To prevent their utilization or em-
ployment on the high seas after leaving port, unlicensed personnel
should be removed from the vessel and deported to the flag state or
other appropriate country. To avoid deportation, merchant marine
personnel should be required to possess the required documents
verifying their status in order to enter the country legally without
passport or visa. Entry without a certificate of competency should
constitute illegal entry based on false pretenses."6 ' The convention
should also proffer a system which forwards reports of incompetent
performance to the flag state which after conducting an investiga-
tion as required, should report on the disposition of the complaint.
Finally, one of the chief goals of the IMCO program must be to
provide a mechanism, such as the proposed International Maritime
Administration Bureau, whereby nations with expertise in these
matters can assist other nations in establishing such a program. The
Bureau itself could take over interim administration until such pro-
grams are established, and it could serve as a training ground for
the future national administrators.
Unfortunately, the chances of reaching agreement on the neces-
sary minutiae of an international uniform officer certification pro-
gram, given the wide disparities in existing national systems, do not
seem bright. There is no lack of models on which to draw since major
maritime nations have long had stringent, comprehensive, albeit
divergent, standards for training, education, testing, and other per-
tinent qualifications. The United States regulations,' 2 for example,
cover dozens of areas including subjects for written examinations,
qualifications for upgrading the permissible tonnage or waters of a
license, physical qualifications, etc. The regulations are adminis-
tered by a staff of hundreds of experienced specialists.' 3 Such stan-
160. See 46 U.S.C. § 224 (a) (6)-(7) (1970), which contain similar provisions for the
enforcement of the Officer's Compentency Certificate Convention of 1936; see infra note 162.
161. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1970).
162. See 46 C.F.R. 187 (1975).
163. The United States system is administered by the Merchant Marine Safety Division
of the United States Coast Guard.
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dards, coupled with stringent construction and equipment require-
ments and inspections, are among the chief reasons that the United
States' maritime safety record is one of the best in the world.
Governments are not the only agencies by which such improved
standards can be achieved. Maritime labor unions have long been
concerned with the safety of their members, but have resisted strin-
gent certification standards in many cases out of fear that such
standards could be used as weapons against them. In addition to
vocal opposition before Congressional committees considering
measures which might increase the liability of ships' officers for
their actions, pressure from maritime labor organizations induced
the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference to adopt a provision'64 negating
the Court of International Justice decision in The Lotus.165 The
Lotus decision had given a nation jurisdiction over any officer enter-
ing its territory who had collided with one of the nation's vessels on
the high seas or who had caused repercussions such as damage or
injury affecting the nation. Lack of jurisdiction over foreign mer-
chant marine personnel has been a recurring problem, particularly
in light of the fact that many nations with appalling safety records
have never instituted a public inquiry into a marine casualty and
have never taken disciplinary action against the personnel in-
volved. 6'
Maritime industry and marine insurance interests can also be
highly influential in establishing such standards. These groups have
always recognized the necessity of protecting their financial interest
in vessels by placing them in competent hands. Programs estab-
lished by the major oil companies to train their masters in the
handling of supertankers through the use of ship-handling courses
and ship simulators serve as models for initial proficiency and quali-
fication testing and periodic recertification and certificage up-
grading programs.' 7 The aid of these groups should be sought in the
formulation of standards, they should be encouraged to scourge
their industry of unscrupulous owners who employ unqualified and
incompetent personnel, and they should pressure noncomplying
states to support and adopt international certification require-
ments.
164. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 11 (1).
165. Case of the S.S. "Lotus" [19271, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
166. Houasesian, Post "Torrey Canyon": Toward a New Solution to the Problem of
Traumatic Oil Spillage, 2 CONN. L. REV. 632, 635 (1970).
167. See TANKER ACCIDENTS, supra note 80, at 6.
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D. Suggested International Regulatory Framework
There exist many areas in which effective international action
can be taken to prevent traumatic vessel source oil pollution of the
marine environment and its attendant vessel damage, economic
loss, and human suffering. The achievement of effective interna-
tional action in these areas is not a function of developing the neces-
sary technology or administrative means. Rather, an international
regulatory framework for traumatic pollution prevention already
awaits the realization of all nations that their common interest lies
in laying aside petty differences to concentrate instead on achieving
the goal of assuring safe ships piloted by competent men in accord-
ance with modern and effective rules of conduct. The savings will
not only include hundreds of lives and billions of dollars, but may
well encompass the ecological basis of marine life.
IV. NATIONAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT TRAUMATIC OIL POLLUTION
A. Introduction
Although international efforts to deal with traumatic pollution
are improving, many nations, perhaps disillusioned with past inter-
national cooperative efforts to deal with such complex issues, have
made the decision to take unilateral action concurrently with their
efforts to arrive at international standards. Such nations can hardly
be faulted for desiring to take immediate action to protect their
environment rather than await the slow progress of international
efforts. On the other hand, the actions taken by these nations, some-
times spurred by political as much as ecological concerns, have
often exceeded the jurisdiction accorded them under current princi-
ples of international law. Such actions have included establishment
of construction and equipment requirements for vessels in innocent
passage, denying passage to vessels of certain size and draft without
respect to the conditions of passage (i.e., channel depth), and ex-
tending their territorial jurisdiction beyond the currently recognized
limit of 12 miles.'68
Many of the measures taken unilaterally by individual nations
present complex strategic, political, and economic questions.'69
168. Although no agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea has been reached, the
limitation of the contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea to a distance of 12 miles from the
baseline of the territorial sea implicitly limits the territorial sea to 12 miles.
169. These questions go beyond the scope of this article and are currently under discus-
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These measures are primarily various operational systems main-
tained under the authority of the coastal state and designed to
either prevent collisions and groundings by the use of systems exter-
nal to the vessel, or to remove vessel activity from the coastal eco-
system entirely. While there are a myriad of proposals, the chief
areas of endeavor involve the upgrading of traditional systems of
aids to navigation and pilotage, the implementation of vessel traffic
systems, and the utilization of off-shore deepwater ports. The pur-
pose of such systems is not to prevent all traumatic pollution, but
primarily to protect the ecologically fragile coastal environment
where the vast majority of collisions and groundings occur. 7 "
B. Navigational Aids: Efforts to Prevent Groundings
The utilization of such traditional aids to navigation as light-
houses, buoys, pilots, and charts are almost as ancient as man's use
of the sea as a highway of commerce. The use of lighthouses to mark
harbor entrances and on shore bonfires to warn ships off shoals
appears in the historical accounts of ancient Egypt, Greece, and
Rome. Two such aids, the Colossus of Rhodes and the Lighthouse
at Alexandria, are counted among the wonders of the ancient world.
While a nation is under no obligation to provide lighthouses and
buoyage per se, 171 there does exist an international duty on the part
of a coastal state to give appropriate publicity to dangers to naviga-
tion of which it is aware. Liability may result when it fails to do so.'
Such publicity need not take the form of aids to navigation to mark
shallows and prevent groundings. However, most nations have cho-
sen to provide such systems in the interest of the promotion and
safety of international commerce.
Modern systems of lighthouses, light structures, and buoys are
technologically advanced, often utilizing solid state electronic cir-
cuitry, solar sensing switches, and automatic or remote control oper-
ation. The use of special radar reflectors on such aids assists in their
detection by ships' radar during periods of reduced visibility and
sion by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
170. Studies have shown that 86.6 percent of tanker collisions and 91.2 percent of tanker
groundings occur within harbors, at harbor entrances, or in the coastal zone. OIL OUTFLOWS,
supra note 40, at 5.
171. Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).




has aided measurably in reducing groundings. Future systems may
include the use of shore mounted transponders' on salient features
of the coastline to further aid the navigator by giving instant identi-
fication of reference points.
The placement and maintenance of all such aids must be done
with great care, because, under the domestic law of many nations,
mariners are entitled to reasonably rely on government aids even
though provided gratuitously, and vessel owners may recover dam-
ages for injuries proximately caused by their malfunction or mislo-
cation.' 4 Some courts have even extended this liability to also allow
recovery by the owners of shore property, commercial fishermen,
and others who are damaged by oil spilled from a grounded tanker
as the result of malfunction or mislocation of government aids. 75
The effective use of aids to navigation not only reduces vessel
groundings, but in many cases has greater cost effectiveness than
more technically sophisticated systems and is thus particularly
suited for use by emerging nations. National efforts on the part of
emerging countries to establish an effective navigational aids sys-
tem should be assisted through an international body such as the
International Maritime Administration Bureau (IMAB). Such a
program, operated under the auspices of IMCO, could include the
transfer of technology as well as the providing of trained personnel
to aid in training future system operators and in establishing the
navigational aid system.
The use of pilots or local seamen intimately familiar with area
waters and procedure, taken onboard arriving vessels to aid the
master, has also had an historic role in the prevention of traumatic
incidents.' A complex body of law, not pertinent here, has grown
173. A transponder receives the radar signal of the vessel, magnifies it (often adding a
distinct characteristic) and re-transmits it to the vessel. The location of the transponder
appears as a magnified, coded blip on the vessel's radar. By comparing transponder blips on
the radar with their charted location, the navigator may locate himself easily and avoid the
common error of mistaking shore features.
174. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Afran Transp. Co. v. United
States, 435 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Annot., 19 A.L.R. Fed.
297 (1974).
175. See Burgess v. MN Tamano, 373 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Me. 1974).
176. The laws and usages affecting pilots can be traced back to Roman times. Repeated
references to the authority of the coastal state to require a pilot appear throughout historical
annals. See, e.g., ROMAN LAW DIGEST, Book 19, tit. 2, Edict of Ulpian, I, 110; THE LAWS OF
OLERON, I, 232; THE CONSULATE DE MER, II, 250; Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 239
(1871).
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up around pilotage and the rights, duties, and liabilities of pilots.
It is well settled that coastal states have the authority to reasonably
require foreign vessels to take a pilot, and to charge incoming vessels
reasonable fees for such services.177 Because of its great dependence
on local conditions and customs, pilotage does not readily lend itself
to uniform international regulation and has traditionally been a
local concern. Pilotage could, however, be the subject of interna-
tional cooperation to the extent that developing nations require as-
sistance in establishing a pilotage system.
The effectiveness of pilotage in further reducing traumatic pol-
lution is somewhat limited because of the human limitations in-
volved and because it has already reached most of its preventive
potential. Further incremental reductions in traumatic incidents
may be achieved, nevertheless, by maintaining scrupulously high
standards of competence for pilots 7 ' and utilizing such technologi-
cal devices as bridge to bridge radiotelephones to augment their
effectiveness. 7
Another traditional method of preventing groundings has been
the use of charts and hydrographic surveys. These charts are liter-
ally a type of "roadmap" of coastal waters with water depths, ship-
wrecks, shoals, buoys and other aids, coastal landmarks, and salient
features marked. Again, great care must be taken in their prepara-
tion or liability for damage to the mariner who reasonably relies on
them to his detriment, will attach to the government. 8
In recent years, the state of the art of hydrographic surveying
and chart preparation has reached great heights.'8 ' Unfortunately,
the great increase in tanker drafts has offset these advances and has
made the detection and marking of underwater wrecks, rocks,
shoals, and pinnacles increasingly important. Because of the ex-
177. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, arts. 17 & 18(2); cf. Homer Ramsdell
Transp. Co. v. Compagnie Generale Transtlantique, 63 F. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1894), aff'd 182 U.S.
406 (1901); Universe Tankships, Inc. v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
178. United States pilots are currently licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard. See 46 U.S.C.
§§ 214-15 (1970).
179. See text accompanying notes 113-22 supra.
180. As in the case of buoys and other aids, the government may avoid liability for
mischartings, malfunctions, and mislocations by giving notice of the discrepancies. Naviga-
tors are put on constructive notice upon issuance of the "Notice to Mariners." Incidents
occurring thereafter do not result in liability. De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States,
451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971).
181. The preparation of charts in the United States is the primary responsibility of the
National Ocean Survey (formerly the Coast and Geodetic Survey) of NOAA.
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treme difficulty in detecting these obstacles by traditional methods,
such as wire dragging and taking soundings, their marking has been
all too frequently limited to after the fact discovery by the ground-
ings of a behemoth vessel resulting in attendant damage and trau-
matic pollution."8 2 This problem is particularly acute in many devel-
oping nations which lack the capability to update surveys that may
be decades old."83 The problem is frequently compounded by con-
stantly shifting bottoms near river mouths and in all important
international straits.
With the use of such exotic devices as side scanning doppler
sonar, which produces a television-like picture by using sound
waves, underwater television cameras, magnetic anomaly detection
gear, and other instruments developed for anti-submarine warfare
and underwater search and rescue purposes, the task of the hydro-
grapher of the future in locating wrecks, pinnacles and other ob-
structions should be greatly eased. His chief task will be recharting
literally millions of square miles of coastal ocean bottom-a task
that will take years. Such a project would seem ideally suited for
international cooperative efforts, such as the adoption of uniform
chart symbols and abbreviations, technical assistance to emerging
nations, and the joint conduct of new international hydrographic
surveys.
At the invitation of a country and with crews augmented by
local trainee/observers, a thorough survey of coastal waters could be
conducted. Priority should be given to waters through which major
shipping lanes pass. Groundings and related traumatic pollution
incidents in such waters would be greatly reduced by the availabil-
ity of these up-to-date, utilitarian charts.
Despite their value, accurate charts, pilots, and other aids to
navigation cannot completely solve the problem of coastal ground-
ings, and they do little to prevent collisions. The reason for this is
that such systems may make it easier for the mariner, but inevitably
their efficiency depends on his individual competence. In an effort
to remove the dependency of traumatic pollution prevention sys-
tems on individual seamen, particularly in light of their deficiencies
182. See generally SUPERSHIP, supra note 52, at 32-39.
183. Some may be older. Throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries, the Royal Navy
conducted surveys of most of the waters of what is now the Third World. Today, these ancient
"Admiralty Charts," which are little changed since the original survey, are often the only
charts available in remote areas.
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previously discussed, and to provide external supervision and con-
trol, the concept of Vessel Traffic Systems has arisen.
C. Vessel Traffic Systems: Efforts to Prevent Collisions
Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) is a term applied to a collection
of marine traffic control systems of varying levels of sophistication
which are designed to impose external supervision and control on
vessel movements ranging from mere surveillance and position mon-
itoring to actually controlling courses, speeds, and other vessel
movements.
In its more sophisticated applications, VTS is not unlike Air
Traffic Control; but while useful parallels can be drawn between the
two systems, the problems faced by a vessel traffic system are often
quite different. The air traffic controller has large amounts of air-
space both vertically and horizontally in which to work his aircraft
while the vessel traffic controller is not only limited to the horizontal
boundaries of the river or harbor but must keep track of drafts,
water depths, channels, and shoals. The vessel controller also deals
with less maneuverable ships which at high speeds require thou-
sands of feet to stop or turn and at too low a speed drift helplessly
with the wind and current. Furthermore, the traffic with which the
vessel traffic controller deals has origins and destinations at a myr-
iad of locations within the harbor area rather than one or two central
airport locations.
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties associated with VTS, such
systems have proven extremely effective in reducing traumatic inci-
dents. Systems of varying degrees of sophistication have been used
in major European ports since the 1950's and 1960's and have re-
sulted in a lower accident rate, while the traffic density has in some
cases doubled.' 4
Similar results can be expected in the United States ports and
waterways. In fact, studies have shown that order can be brought
from the seeming chaos of thousands of vessels and almost all trau-
matic incidents can be eliminated, except for those caused by unex-
pected equipment failure or gross human error.' 5
184. The Rotterdam VTS has reduced the accident rate to one quarter of its previous
level since 1951, although traffic density doubled during the same period. TANKER ACCIDENTS,
supra note 80, at 9-10.
185. See UNITED STATES COAST GUARD STUDY REPORT: VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEMS: ANALYSIS
OF PORT NEEDS 15-16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as VTS PORT STUDY].
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The United States, however, has been very slow to respond to
the need for VTS and lags behind much of the world. One reason
for this failure to respond has been the lack of any United States
agency's statutory authority to undertake such action. The agency
primarily responsible for maritime safety, the United States Coast
Guard, has experimented with Harbor Advisory Radar (HAR), but
its statutory authority to regulate or direct vessel movement has
been limited in the past to only that which is necessary to eliminate
threats to port safety (e.g. dangerous cargoes) and national security
under the Magnuson Act.' However, growing awareness of the
traumatic pollution problem, increased tanker traffic, burgeoning
barge traffic, the growing use of waterways for the transportation of
hazardous materials,'87 and several catastrophic collisions which
could have been prevented by VTS, have all combined to convince
Congress to pass Title I of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of
1972 .1 The Act provides the authority, for the first time, to regulate
vessel movement, construction, and equipment for the protection of
the marine environment as well as the protection of life and prop-
erty. The Act empowers the Secretary of the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating to issue regulations covering a wide
spectrum of activities within the port area.'89
The establishment of VTS is specifically provided by the broad
regulatory power vested in the Secretary.' Under this authority,
186. 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
187. See generally VTS Legislative History, supra note 94.
188. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973). One particular accident pointed up the
need for mandantory VTS. On Jan. 18, 1971 the tankers Arizona Standard and Oregon
Standard collided in San Francisco Bay spilling millions of gallons of oil. One vessel and the
Coast Guard experimental Harbor Advisory Radar (HAR) could see the collision developing,
but could not communicate with the other vessel because it was not required to maintain
radio contact. Bylin, When Ships Don't Pass in the Night, Wall Street Journal, March 9,
1971, at 18, col. 4.
189. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221(4)-(9) (Supp. HI, 1973). The authority includes safety
equipment requirements, cargo handling and transfer procedures, anchoring and mooring
rule, etc.
190. Sec. 1221 of the Act provides that the Secretary may:
(1) establish, operate, and maintain vessel traffic services and systems for ports,
harbors, and other waters subject to congested vessel traffic;
(2) require vessels which operate in an area of a vessel traffic service or system
to utilize or comply with that service or system, including the carrying or installa-
tion of electronic or other devices necessary for the use of the service or system;
(3) control vessel traffic in areas which he determines to be especially hazard-
ous, or under conditions of reduced visibility, adverse weather, vessel congestion,
or other hazardous circumstances . . ..
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the Coast Guard has undertaken a major effort and VTS is already
in operation in San Francisco, Puget Sound and the Hous-
ton/Galveston Ship Channel. Other systems are being studied for
New York Harbor/Long Island Sound, New Orleans, the Intracoas-
tal Waterway between New Orleans and Galveston, the Chesapeake
Bay (Hampton Roads to Baltimore), the Port of Chicago, the Dela-
ware River/Bay and Port of Valdez, Alaska which will be the south-
ern terminus of the Alaskan pipeline and a major tanker port.
1
The national VTS, as envisioned by the Coast Guard, will not
encompass all of our national waterways, however. The Coast Guard
first analyzes the safety records of each port, the type and causes of
its accidents, its traffic density, and projected future development,
and then conducts a rigorous cost benefit analysis to determine
whether the employment of VTS is justified."' Once the preliminary
decision is made that a port requires a VTS approach, further cost
benefit analysis will determine what specific systems or combina-
tion of systems will be employed." 3
Aside from the use of bridge to bridge radiotelephones and
traffic separation schemes (TSS), 94 one of the most basic forms of
VTS is the Vessel Movement Reporting System (VMRS), 95 whereby
191. VTS Port Study, supra note 185, at 24-28. These sites were selected on the basis of
the greatest need for accident reduction, but others may be added as political and ecological
factors make their weight felt. Despite its slow start, the VTS effort in the United States has
made great gains in the field and has attracted world attention, particularly in the use of
computers with direct high resolution radar input to predict collision situations.
192. Id. at 1-11.
193. The vessel traffic system is controlled by the vessel traffic center which is manned
wholly by Coast Guard personnel. Special regulations adapted to the local situation and
having the force of law are promulgated to implement the system, and specify in great detail
the procedures with which the covered vessels must comply. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 161,
Subpart B (1975) containing the regulations for the Puget Sound VTS. These regulations
apply to all vessels 300 GRT and over, passenger vessels over 100 GRT, pushing/towing vessels
over 26 feet, dredges, and floating plants. A vessel must check in and out of the system, give
advance notice of arrival and departure, report origin and destination within the system, and
any special circumstances or dangerous cargoes, as well as the vessel's name, type, length,
draft, and speed over the ground. Other regulations require vessels to use the English lan-
guage, maintain a continuous radio watch, report hazards, and transmit their intentions to.
other vessels in certain areas when meeting, crossing, or overtaking. The Coast Guard reserves
the right to actually direct vessel movement but normally does not. In some cases, the study
may result in the adoption of regulations especially tailored to the accident reduction needs
of the port. Such regulations may include maximum tow length, minimum power require-
ments for push/tow vessels, times of bridge openings, etc. VTS PORT STUDY, supra note 185,
at 12.
194. See section III, B supra.
195. Vessels may also be required to give advance notice of entry and departure in the
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vessels moving within the system check in periodically at desig-
nated points by radio to the vessel traffic center. The vessel traffic
center plots their movements on a scale mock-up of the area and
advises them of converging traffic and developing situations as re-
ported to them.
Another sophisticated system is called "Basic Surveillance"
whereby inexpensive, commercially available (or "off the shelf")
radars and television cameras may be used to allow greater observa-
tion and supervision. Basic surveillance systems are particularly
useful in restricted waters and at critical bends and intersections in
waterways and ship channels as a supplement to VMRS. The per-
sonnel of the Vessel Traffic Center can see the situation developing
and give advance notice to approaching vessels.' 8
The most sophisticated VTS System is the "Automated Ad-
vanced Surveillance" which utilizes expensive, specially made, high
resolution radars and positive control features such as coding tran-
sponders, similar to those utilized by air controllers and computers.
These are able to project vessel movements automatically and warn
of developing collisions. Such systems are intended for extremely
dense traffic situations or areas experiencing frequent low visibility
where such positive control features, including actual direction of
vessel movements by traffic center personnel, are essential.' 7
The growing use of such vessel traffic systems raises interesting
questions and conflicts of domestic and international law. One of
the first such conflicts is between the traditional authority and re-
sponsibility of a captain to control his ship and his duty to comply
with the regulation or, in some cases, positive direction, of vessel
movements under a VTS. Crucial questions in such cases concern
when the master is entitled to or required to follow VTS direction
and when the utilization of his own best judgment becomes permis-
sible or even mandatory.' 8 There can be little doubt that when a
master totally ignores the VTS or is patently wrong in overriding it,
VTS, check in at designated points, queue for passage through restricted waters, and relay
information on courses, speeds, draft, cargo, etc. VTS PORT STUDY, supra note 185, at 13.
196. Id. at 15.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Union Shipping and Trading v. United States, 127 F.2d 771, 775 (2d Cir.
1942); United States v. The Westervelt, 135 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Ralli v.
Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 401-02 (1894); Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 63 F. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1894), aff'd, 182 U.S. 406 (1900).
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liability will result.'9 In order to resolve these conflicts, it is highly
likely that the courts will look to cases dealing with compulsory
pilotage for analogies. Similarly, there is little doubt that the gov-
ernment will be called on to answer in damages 00 for active negli-
gence in issuing erroneous instructions or information under the line
of cases dealing with more conventional aids to navigation. 0 ' Less
clear, however, is the outcome in situations where the judgment call
is not clear, or when the master fails to override erroneous or insuffi-
cient VTS instructions to avoid a collision. Also unclear is the result
when the vessel traffic center does not issue erroneous information
or directions, but merely fails to advise a vessel of a potentially
dangerous situation or converging vessel.
Liability in these cases will probably hinge on the sophistica-
tion of the system in operation and the amount of information avail-
able to the master. Responsibility probably would not shift to the
government for passive negligence until positive control of vessel
movements is involved. Moreover, the recent adoption by the Su-
preme Court of the comparative negligence method of apportioning
damages in admiralty cases02 will greatly ease the burden of assess-
ing liability by allowing factors such as the knowledge available to
each party, the VTS level and regulations, and the nature of the
contested action (e.g. non-feasance/misfeasance, compliance/
override) to interplay with traditional collision rules.2 3
The use of VTS also presents difficulties under international
law. Within their territorial seas, coastal states certainly have suffi-
cient sovereignty to establish such systems.0 4 Foreign vessels0 5 seek-
ing entry to internal waters where such systems are in operation
may be required to comply with them as a condition of such entry.10
199. This would result in liability both on the basis of fault and under the rule of The
Pennsylvania in the case of breach of statutory safety regulations.
200. VTS Legislative History, supra note 94, at 2792.
201. See, e.g., Afran Transp. Co. v. United States, 435 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1970). The policy
decision has been made that potential benefits of accident reduction outweigh the increased
exposure to tort liability.
202. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
203. Another alternative would be the adoption by Congress of a statute clarifying the
obligations of a master under a VTS or insulating him from liability for complying with any
vessel movement direction.
204. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 2(1).
205. The vessels of the United States may, of course, always be required to comply with
United States navigation laws regardless of the nature of the waters.
206. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 16(2); cf. Payne v. S.S. Tropic
Breeze, 423 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Vessels merely engaged in innocent passage, however, without entry
into internal waters are subject to less control. The application of
VTS to such vessels would seem perfectly justified, since it is a
regulation in the interest of marine safety and furthers the exercise
of the freedom of international navigation."7 But the exercise of
VTS jurisdiction to unreasonably hamper vessels in innocent pas-
sage would be unlawful.2 °9
The same rationale would be applicable to international
straits.10 Not only would VTS not provide a legal basis for unreason-
able interference with the right of transit through international
straits, but the effective use of such systems could operate to alle-
viate many of the valid ecological concerns which have prompted
some of the demands by nations bordering straits for increased juris-
diction over transiting vessels. Rather than discouragement of VTS,
the major goal of international maritime cooperation should be the
implementation of such safety oriented systems.
Beyond the territorial sea, the establishment and enforcement
of VTS regulations is more difficult. The jurisdiction of the coastal
state is limited to prevention of violations of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary regulations 0 within a contiguous zone
extending up to 12 miles from its coast.2 ' Aside from the effect of
this limited jurisdiction, the waters retain their high seas character-
istics and may not be subject to coastal state sovereignty."' Since
the application of VTS to such waters would amount, in a limited
sense, to an assertion of sovereignty, alternative methods of ensur-
ing foreign vessel compliance with VTS which need to be enforced
beyond 3 miles must be found. One of the best ways to lawfully
exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels for such a reasonable and
limited purpose is by agreement with the flag state through the
amendment of the large number of treaties of commerce, friendship
and navigation currently in effect."'
207. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 17.
208. Id. art. 15(1).
209. Although the Department of Defense sought to have international straits excluded
from the provisions of the VTS enabling legislation out of concern for the strategic implica-
tions of coastal state authority to operate comprehensive vessel traffic control systems in such
straits, Congress expressly rejected such concerns as unwarranted. VTS Legislative History,
supra note 94, at 2793.
210. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 24(1).
211. Id. art. 24(2).
212. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 2.
213. See, e.g., The Treaty of Jan. 23, 1924, between the United States and Great Britain
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For vessels of those nations not party to these treaties the admi-
ralty courts of the United States or the world could adopt judicial
presumptions which would operate heavily against vessels which do
not comply with the high seas VTS. Similar presumptions have
been utilized in the Gulf of Mexico to encourage compliance with
high seas safety fairways among offshore oil rigs." 4 Since vessels in
collision frequently must go into the coastal state for repairs, admi-
ralty jurisdiction upon a collision would be inevitable and could be
avoided only if the vessel and her sister ships forfeit profitable trade
in that jurisdiction. Therefore, voluntary compliance would be
greatly encouraged by such a presumption.
Since the establishment of such a high seas VTS would consti-
tute a use of the high seas, its provisions must not unreasonably
interfere with the freedom of navigation."' Only the implementation
of positive vessel control might fail to meet these criteria. Given the
interest of the coastal state in protecting its coastal environment
and the value of such systems in preserving life and property and
preventing traumatic pollution, there should be little basis for inter-
national objection to mandatory participation in a reasonable advi-
sory system within the contiguous zone. Although there may be
situations where VTS is needed beyond 12 miles, such a distance
would encompass the vast majority of VTS jurisdictional needs."'
The world's maritime nations worry unduly about possible stra-
tegic and jurisdictional implications of VTS. Instead, they should
strive to utilize its prevention potential to the limit. The establish-
ment of VTS in the major international straits, coupled with new
hydrographic surveys, modernized aids to navigation, and efficient
pollution control systems is in the best interests of both the mar-
permitting the United States to exercise jurisdiction over British vessels within 1 hour's
sailing time of the United States coast for the purpose of enforcing Prohibition era anti-
smuggling laws. 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. No. 685, 27 L.N.T.S. 182.
214. See, e.g., Brown & Root Marine Operators Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d
724 (5th Cir. 1967) (raising a prima facie presumption of fault against a vessel which strayed
from safety fairways and collided with a stationary oil rig); The Victor, 153 F.2d 200, 202 (5th
Cir. 1946). But see Boudoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 281 F.2d 81, 88 (5th Cir. 1960) (where'
the presumption may be overcome by unavoidable circumstances). In some cases, the dam-
ages may be apportioned (such as where the vessel leaves the fairway but the structure is
not lighted).
215. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 2.
216. The adoption of a 12 mile territorial sea by the Third United Nations Conference




time nations and the coastal nations. IMCO, operating through ei-
ther IMAB or its Maritime Safety Committee should undertake
immediate efforts to facilitate international cooperation in this
area. The establishment of training programs, technology transfer,
and surveys of particularly suitable areas are of the highest priority.
Uniform international procedures for VTS communication must be
established, as well as standards for the training and licensing of
vessel traffic controllers. Programs to familiarize masters and pilots
who will operate within a VTS must also be developed.
These upgrading projects, although expensive, could be funded
simultaneously by reasonable user charges. Although nations may
not charge for mere passage, the rendering of specific services such
as VTS, unlike surveys and aids to navigation, would justify a rea-
sonable user charge. " There is no reason why straits nations should
bear the severe ecological damage of traumatic pollution and also
the total cost of upgrading prevention systems. The nations whose
vessels will primarily benefit from the improved conditions should,
by international negotiations and agreement under the auspices of
IMCO, bear their fair share of the costs. '
D. Offshore Deepwater Ports
Another approach to the reduction of coastal traumatic pollu-
tion damage is to reduce traffic density"' in the coastal zone and
remove the greatest potential pollution threats entirely by having
supertankers220 and other large vessels utilize offshore deepwater
217. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 18; Commentary of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 4 WHITEMAN DIG. INT'L L. 397 (1965). But see Convention Regarding
the Regime of the Straits, signed at Montreaux July 20, 1936, art, 2; 4 WHITEMAN DIG. INT'L
L. 398 (1965). This does not prevent shipping nations from agreeing by treaty to pay for the
establishment and operation of aids which the coastal state would not normally be under a
duty to provide.
218. The most efficient way of levying such charges would be to divide the total annual
cost of operating the VTS, as certified by IMCO, as well as an amortized portion of the
establishment cost, among the governments of the nations whose vessels use the strait, pro-
portionately to their use. No discrimination of nationality, size, or type of vessel (tanker,
warship) should be allowed. The governments are then free to either absorb the costs or pass
them on to the vessel owners.
219. Traffic density is, itself, a major factor in causing certain types of traumatic inci-
dents such as collisions. Since every vessel added to a situation complicates maneuvering
until the capacity of the Rules of the Road and man is exceeded, every vessel removed from
the traffic helps to reduce the probability of collision.
220. Although the use of supertankers is presently in decline due to worldwide decrease
in the demand for oil and overbuilding, the long term economic future seems bright since the
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ports. The initial impetus for such ports arose not from ecological
considerations, but rather from the growing United States depen-
dence on foreign oil2' and the need to import that oil as cheaply as
possible by utilizing supertankers.22 The use of such tankers for the
direct importation of oil to the United States port is presently im-
possible; however, since no major United States port is capable of
handling a true supertanker and only a few can handle a tanker of
any appreciable size.223 To dredge out the required 690 miles of
channel to the depths necessary to accommodate such large vessels
would require excavating some 9.2 billion cubic yards of earth."
Not only would the dollar cost be staggering but the ecological dam-
age wrought to estuarine systems would be incalculable.225 Other
alternatives such as lightering,25 transshipment, 27 and at-sea trans-
basic economies of scale hold firm. Whatever the size of tankers in the future, the basic
rationale for using offshore "superports" remains valid.
221. Presently the United States uses approximately 18,400,000 barrels of oil daily of
which 7,600,000 are imported. By 1985, we will use almost 26,885,000 barrels per day of which
perhaps as much as 15,160,000 barrels will be imported (even with the North Slope of Alaska
coming into production). Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 125.
222. The freight savings of a 500,000 DWT tanker over a 50,000 DWT tanker may range
from $4.60 to $8.00 per ton or as much as $4 million per trip (actually 3.2t per gallon).
Additionally, only one tanker is used instead of ten, reducing traffic congestion and accident
probability. Senate D WPHearings, supra note 7, at 64; Hearings on H.R 5091 and H.R. 5898
Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-
15, at 39 and Chart at 387 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House DWP Hearings].
223. See, e.g,, House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, at 13; Lawrence, Superports, Air-
ports and other Fixed Installations on the High Seas, 6 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 575 (1975).
No east coast port south of Maine nor any Gulf Coast port can accomodate a tanker over
80,000 DWT. The average depth of water in each coast ports is only 45 feet. On the west coast,
only Seattle and Long Beach can accomodate a tanker larger than 50,000 DWT. U.S. COAST
GUARD, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR DEEPWATER PORT REGULATIONS 6 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Draft DWP/EIS].
224. See generally Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 65-73.
225. A great deal of life is destroyed by the pulverization by the dredging operation while
more is smothered by the deposit of spoil. Generally, there is 80 percent destruction of marine
life in the area affected. Taylore & Salomon, Some Effects of Hydraulic Dredging and Coastal
Development in Boca Ciega Bay, Florida, 67 FISHERY BULL. 213, 219-35 (1968). Dredging can
also cause salt water intrusion into fresh water coastal aquifers, an important source of
drinking water. Hirsch, Special Circumstances: Superports, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE.
EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS 217, 221 (J. Gamble ed, 1973).
226. Lightering is a process whereby small tankers or barges come alongside a super-
tanker for the purpose of discharging the supertanker's cargo.
227. Transshipment is presently done from Caribbean deepwater ports on a reduced
scale. Problems with this method include the increased costs of the additional transfer and




fer"2 were also rejected.2 9 Offshore deepwater ports, however, were
found to present an economic method for importing large quantities
of foreign oil into the United States. 3 It was also determined, al-
most simultaneously, that such ports presented the best solution to
the growing threat of traumatic vessel source oil pollution of the
coastal environment.
2 31
In its simplest form, an offshore deepwater port (DWP) is an
installation which is located off the coast at a distance sufficient to
provide adequate water depth to accomodate the largest tankers. It
provides connections via hoses and underwater pipelines to the
shore by which the tanker may take on or discharge oil."'2 The pro-
jected costs of a deepwater port with its moorings, platforms, pipe-
lines and shoreside facilities are currently estimated at approxi-
228. For example, The Cargo Oil Sea Transfer System (COSTS), whereby a supertanker
transfers oil into a small tanker underway at sea, in company behind it, in a manner similar
to the Russian Navy's underway replenishment system and the United States Air Force's
mid-air refueling method. See Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 596-600 for a detailed
description of the system in operation.
229. A common problem shared by all these alternatives is that they would require the
use of many smaller tankers or tankbarges with their higher costs. The number of tankers
necessary to meet expected import requirements would also increase traffic density and the
risk of traumatic incident. It has been estimated that 2,600 tankers of 47,000 DWT would be
required to handle United States imports in 1985. Frankel, Offshore Tanker Terminals: Study
in Depth, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROc., March 1973, at 56, 58.
230. Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 171-87. The following table, adapted from
House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, illustrates both the problems and the savings. The
figures for Daily Arrivals are for the number of tankers necessary to supply 3,000,000 barrels
per day:
Tanker Daily Relative
Size Arrivals Draft Cost
30,000 DWT 13 35 100%
50,000 DWT 8 38 88%
250,000 DWT 1.5 65 45%
500,000 DWT .75 95 38%
231. This was determined by the Council of Environmental Quality. House DWP Hear-
ings, supra note 222, at 97. However, deepwater ports have been attacked by some groups,
such as the Sierra Club, as ecologically dangerous. Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at
567-92, 823-92.
232. This installation may be an artificial island, sea island, rigid-arm mooring, multiple
mooring bouys, or single point mooring bouy. The Single Point Mooring (SPM) is the system
overwhelmingly favored by the United States deepwater ports projects now under considera-
tion. For a detailed examination of single point mooring design, operation, and reliability, as
well as a discussion of deepwater port technology, see Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7,
at 380-99; House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, at 102, 378. The two major SPM systems
are the Single Anchor Leg Mooring (SALM) and the Catenary Anchor Leg Mooring (CALM).
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mately $500 million.233 Despite this expense, the use of deepwater
ports promises not only to provide for the economic importation of
foreign oil, but it should greatly lower traumatic incidents by reduc-
ing coastal traffic density and keeping tankers in deepwater away
from shipping lanes thus minimizing the risk of grounding and colli-
sion. Of course, care must be taken to ensure that deep water port
operations themselves do not become a source of oil pollution. 34
The use of offshore deepwater port technology also promises to
provide facilities for superships other than tankers.35 Since deepwa-
ter ports are much cheaper than building or replacing traditional
harbor facilities, 3 ' established trading nations may turn large parts
of present antiquated harbor facilities to other uses, while develop-
ing nations may choose to use deepwater ports and their associated
cargo systems exclusively. While deepwater ports are not suitable
for all types of cargoes, 37 it seems likely that the future will see
233. The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) planned for a location 17 miles off Louis-
iana, estimates that it will cost $528 million for 3 SPM's and two 48 inch pipelines, 21 miles
to shore with associated facilities. Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 149, 376-795.
SEADOCK, planned for 25 miles off Freeport, Texas, estimates that it will cost $310 million for
offshore facilities including pipeline, $80 million for the onshore terminal, and $155 million
for the onshore distribution system. House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, at 45; Senate
DWP Hearings, supra note 7 at 363-80. AMERAPORT is also proposed for a location off the
Mississippi-Alabama border. House D WPHearings at 438-517; Senate D WPHearings at 468-
74. Most of these projects are backed by a consortium of oil companies.
234. Some risk of pollution does exist, but the offshore location of the port removes it
from fragile coastal ecosystems and gives clean-up authorities adequate time in which to
respond. Port operations are also geared to minimize spillage. A tanker approaches to the
general vicinity of an SPM and stops. A tender brings the necessary mooring lines to the
tanker. The tanker is moored to a swivel and may adjust to changes in the wind and current
by swinging or "weathervaning" 360 degrees. Similarly swiveled floating discharge hoses are
also brought to the tanker and made fast. The oil flows at a high rate from the tanker, through
the discharge hose to the mooring. From the SPM it flows by pipeline to the platforms
(similar to current offshore oil platforms) and from there to the onshore refinery via the main
pipeline. Every connection in the oil transfer system is fitted with special automatic and
remotely operable safety valves. Operations are monitored from the operations platform
which also contains offices and living quarters for the port's crew. Oil may be shut down
instantly in the event of an emergency. The average port would consist of three widely
separated SPM's and one or two platforms. Senate D WP Hearings, supra note 7, at 380-99.
235. Examples are Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) vessels and Barge Aboard Catamaran
(BACAT) vessels where cargo is containerized in floating lighters or barges which are loaded
and offloaded by the ship's own cranes from the water alongside. The lighters are then made
up into tows and taken into inland ports and waterways for ultimate distribution. Such
vessels can handle 72 percent more cargo in 50 percent of the port time of a conventional
freighter and no port facilities other than a mooring are required. See Barges That Go to Sea
in Ships: LASH Vessels, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 7, 1971, at 74-75.
236. Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7, at 171-87.
237. Bulk cargoes such as ore, wheat, etc. are difficult to handle in such ports although
some cargoes may be slurried.
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increasing application of the concept once their vague status under
international law is resolved.
The complicated status of the United States deepwater ports
under international law results from the fact that all United States
deepwater ports must be built outside of the current 3 mile United
States territorial sea.2" This is due to a number of considerations.
First, and most obvious, it is usually necessary to go beyond 3 miles
to attain the necessary water depth, particularly in the Gulf of
Mexico, although this factor would not require a legislative man-
date."' Second, it is desirable to move the ports far enough offshore
to protect the coastal zone and provide a water barrier to insulate
the coast from spills and allow reaction time for control measures
to be taken. Third, and perhaps most important, is the fact that
under domestic law, the Continental Shelf Lands inside 3 miles
upon which such ports would be built belong to the various states.4 0
The United States retained only a navigational servitude and the
right to regulate construction in the waters over the shelf 4' when it
quit-claimed these lands to the states under the Submerged Lands
Act. While this is sufficient to prevent the construction of a deepwa-
ter port under state authority without United States permission,
other major problems such as obtaining state submerged lands, con-
current jurisdiction, state taxation rights, as well as possible state
opposition242 make the construction of deepwater ports within the 3
mile limit undesirable, even if it is practically and ecologically feasi-
ble.
Beyond 3 miles, however, the United States has exclusive rights
to the Continental Shelf both under international243 and domestic
238. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1502(10) (Supp. Vi, 1974).
239. Such considerations do mean, however, that even the adoption of a 12-mile terri-
torial sea would not affect the status of most projects now under consideration, since they
are beyond 12 miles.
240. See The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
241. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1314 (1970); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401,
403 (1970).
242. The Northeastern States have been vehement in their opposition to deepwater ports
such as NADOT (North Atlantic Deepwater Oil Terminal) proposed for the Delaware Bay.
See Senate DWP Hearings, supra note 7 at 1251-69. Their chief fears are the onshore impacts,
such as the construction or expansion of oil refineries. This may dictate siting near existing
refineries or expensive long distance hook-up by pipeline. Id. at 408-09. Delaware has at-
tempted to prohibit a deepwater port by statute. Coastal Zone Act, 7 DELAWARE CODE §§ 7001-
7013 (1974).
243. The rights of the United States to the Continental Shelf under international law
arise under Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, June 10, 1964, [19641
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law244 with the exception of the Gulf of Mexico, where Texas and
Florida 45 exercise 9 mile jurisdiction-still well short of the water
depth necessary for such ports. 4' While some problems concerning
state jurisdiction will still exist, particularly with onshore facilities
and pipeline connections, the location of deepwater ports beyond 3
miles provides for uniform federal regulation"7 and prevents domes-
tic legal problems, although it raises thorny questions of interna-
tional law.
The chief questions under international law which arise with
respect to the location of such offshore ports on the high seas are
first, whether the United States, or any coastal nation, has the
jurisdiction to build and operate such ports beyond its territorial
sea; and second, what jurisdiction does the coastal nation have
within the deepwater port with respect to enforcement of the neces-
sary laws and regulations?
The controversy over jurisdiction to construct offshore deepwa-
ter ports on the high seas 48 revolves primarily around differing phi-
losophies of the nature of international law. One group views legal
rights on the high seas as flowing only from existing international
law and asserts that, since there is no authorization under present
international law for such ports, they may not be lawfully con-
structed on the high seas. The pragmatists, on the other hand, as-
sert that any use of the high seas not expressly forbidden by interna-
tional law is permissible as long as it does not constitute an unrea-
sonable interference with the rights of other nations. 49
1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
244. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
245. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 65, 132 (1960).
246. See authority cited in note 235 supra. Generally speaking, a minimum depth of 100
feet is required for a deepwater port.
247. United States regulatory authority extends to this area under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1970); see, e.g., United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d
16 (5th Cir. 1970), affg 294 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
248. Within the territorial sea, the coastal nation is sovereign and may build and regu-
late deepwater ports at will subject only to the requirements that they must not hamper
innocent passage (particularly through international straits and major shipping lanes); they
should be properly marked and publicized so as not to constitute a hazard to navigation; they
must not cause injury or interference to an adjoining state or the use of the contiguous high
seas. Since these limitations exist on the exercise of sovereignty in the territorial sea, they
would a fortiori be applicable to deepwater ports on the high seas as well. See generally
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, arts. 1, 14-16; The Corfu Channel Case, (1949)
I.C.J. 4 at 28; The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938); A. SOONS, ARTIFICIAL
ISLANDS AND INSTALLATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-6 (1974).
249. See, e.g., Knight, International Legal Aspects of Deep Draft Harbor Facilities, 4 J.
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In order to fully understand the differences between these two
opposing theories of high seas usage, it is necessary to examine the
present legal regime of the high seas. Under present international
law, as codified in the Convention on the High Seas, 5" no nation
may validly subject any portion of the high seas to its sovereignty.
The freedom of the seas is guaranteed to all nations, but must be
exercised under the conditions of the treaty and other rules of inter-
national law. 5' Certain specific uses are recognized inter alia as
valid exercises of the freedom of the sea. These include navigation,
fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and flight over the
high seas. '2 The uses expressly recognized, however, are not the only
ones to which the high seas may validly be put. The convention also
recognizes such uses as are generally recognized by the accepted
principles of international law and which are exercised with reason-
able regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the
freedom of the seas.253 An acceptable use must, therefore, not
amount to an assertion of sovereignty, must be generally recognized,
and must be reasonably exercised with respect to the interests of
other nations to be valid under international law.
There are few international provisions dealing with high seas
installations, and none of these may expressly serve as a basis for
recognizing deepwater ports as a per se reasonable use of the high
seas. The chief provisions dealing with fixed high seas installations
are found in Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.5 4
This article recognizes the right of a coastal state to build and
maintain structures on the Continental Shelf which: (1) do not re-
sult in any unjustifiable interference with navigation or fishing; 5 '
(2) have no territorial sea of their own nor affect the delimitation
thereof; 5 ' (3) are constructed after due notice and properly
marked;5 7 (4) do not encroach unreasonably on essential recognized
international sea lanes;5 and (5) which duly protect the living re-
MARITIME L. & CoM. 367, 380-85 (1973).
250. High Seas Convention, supra note 73.
251. Id. art. 2.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Shelf Convention, supra note 243.
255. Id. art. 5(1).
256. Id. art. 5(4).
257. Id. art. 5(5).
258. Id. art. 5(6).
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sources of the sea.2" Such installations are expressly limited, how-
ever, to those "necessary for the exploration and exploitation of the
resources of the Continental Shelf."26 ° This limitation on Continen-
tal Shelf installations has led some commentators to reason that,
under the principle of treaty interpretation inclusio unius est exclu-
sio alterius,26' the use of high seas installations for non-resource
purposes is thereby prohibited under presently accepted interna-
tional law."2 This has led some nations to take the position that
deepwater ports can not be validly constructed or regulated on the
high seaS.113
Such an interpretation fails to take into account the dynamic
nature of international law. The International Court of Justice has
adopted a more flexible approach to determining the validity of a
coastal state's exercise of jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. In
the Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway),' 4 the
court developed an analytical process to determine the validity of
the exercise of jurisdiction by first looking at the delimitation under
municipal law and then determining its validity with regard to other
states based on accepted international law. While this case dealt
with the validity of drawing baselines and the extension of the terri-
torial sea, the reasoning of the court is laudable and should be
equally valid in a case where only limited jurisdiction to use the high
seas is sought." '6
Under a pragmatic approach to the right of coastal states to
construct deepwater ports on the high seas, the absence of a clear
authorization or an express prohibition requires that the validity of
the use be determined by its reasonableness and regard for the
rights of other states. This recognizes that the true nature of inter-
national law is one of constant claim, protest, rejection, and adjust-
ment as nations constantly attempt to accommodate competing
claims to the necessities of world order. Moreover, the proponents
who view Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf as a
259. Id. art. 5(7).
260. Id. art. 5(2).
261. The inclusion of one right implies the exclusion of any other.
262. See Knight, supra note 249, at 381.
263. Id.; See Letter from Representative of Belgium to the Secretary General of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/35 (1971).
264. (1951) I.C.J. 116.
265. See generally Dorshaw, The International Legal Implications of Off-Shore Terminal
Facilities, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 205 (1974).
[Vol. 30:985
OIL POLLUTION
limitation on offshore installations fail to take into consideration the
fact that the convention itself is a codification of the reasonableness
of a unilateral claim to limited extra-territorial jurisdiction. '
The legality of high seas deepwater ports under international
law should not be determined on the basis of whether such a use is
legal or illegal ab initio. The concept of reasonable use prevents such
determinations. ' What constitutes a reasonable use in some cir-
cumstances will not constitute reasonable use in others. However,
taking this factor into account, an initial determination can be
made as to the possibility that a given use will be reasonable and
thus accepted or acquiesced to by other nations.
When the constituent elements of a deepwater port are ana-
lyzed, it is quickly discovered that they offer no new use of the high
seas which has not been previously recognized under international
law. Taking the operations platform first, it becomes apparent that
such platforms are expressly authorized under the Continental Shelf
Convention."' Although that particular provision has been limited
to resource related activities, that provision must be taken as non-
limiting in view of the widespread historical use of similar structures
for navigational aids, anti-aircraft platforms and radar towers.6 9 It
is difficult to see how merely changing the type of activity con-
ducted on such a platform changes the basic reasonableness of its
existence. Indeed, it would seem that the provisions of Article 5 of
the Continental Shelf Convention should be applied mutatis
mutandi to nonresource related high seas installations and should
be used in determining the reasonableness of their establishment. 0
Such an application would also defeat charges that deepwater ports
amount to an assertion of sovereignty on the basis that they consti-
tute an exclusive and permanent use of the high seas. Deepwater
266. The first claim to special rights in offshore minerals and resources was a unilateral
assertion by the United States. Other nations quickly embraced the concept which was
subsequently codified in the Shelf Convention. See Truman Proclamation on the Continental
Shelf, 10 FED. REG. 12303 (1945); 4 WHITEMAN DIG. INT'L LAW 756 (1965).
267. See Knight, supra 249, at 377 n.59.
268. See note 243 supra.
269. See Dorshaw, supra note 265, at 209. Failure to recognize this obvious parallel would
result in the anomalous situation of an oil platform being a "reasonable" and legal use, while
an identical operations platform of a deepwater port a few miles away would be unreasonable
and illegal.
270. The effect of this would be to assume that such facilities constituted a reasonable
and valid use of the high seas as long as due notice is given, the structures are marked, and
they do not interfere with sea lanes. See note 248 supra.
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ports do not constitute a permanent legal use since their legality is
concomitant with their utilization. Abandoned installations are no
longer legal and must be capable of removal.2"'
The second element of the deepwater ports which may be sub-
jected to similar analysis is the pipelines running to the coastal
state. The right to lay such pipelines is expressly recognized as a
high seas freedom 72 and the extensive coverage of such facilities
under international law 73 must result in the determination that
such a use is per se reasonable and acceptable. Similarly, the single
point mooring buoys are analagous to such traditional uses of the
high seas as anchoring, mooring and navigational buoys, and light-
ships.274 Parallels may also be drawn to roadsteads 5 and similar
incidents to the exercise of the high seas freedom of navigation.
It is extremely difficult to see how the combination of such
traditionally recognized uses of the high seas into a deepwater port
facility should change the reasonableness of their use under interna-
tional law. The establishment of deepwater port facilities on the
high seas must be accepted as a reasonable exercise of the freedom
of the seas. However, the basic guidelines of Article 5 of the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf must be followed and due care taken
not to interfere with the legitimate interests and uses of other na-
tions.27
This is the position taken by the United States. 77 In enacting
the Deepwater Port Act, Congress took great pains to provide that
the Act would not affect the legal status of the high seas or the
Continental Shelf;27 that the living resources of the sea would be
protected;27 that the ports would be properly marked for naviga-
tional safety and safety zones established;2"' and that United States
271. Shelf Convention, supra note 243, art. 5(5).
272. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 2.
273. See, e.g., High Seas Convention, supra note 73, arts. 26-29.
274. See Statement by John Norton Moore, Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on
the Law of the Sea, June 12, 1973, in House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, at 69.
275. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 9.
276. Other nations have arrived at a similar result by utilizing the "legal vacuum" theory
which states that where there is no jurisdiction, what is not expressly prohibited is permitted
as long as it is reasonable. See, e.g., The North Sea Equipment Act of 1964, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 340 (1966), whereby the Netherlands extended its jurisdiction to all installations on its
Continental Shelf. See also Dorshaw, supra note 265, at 219; SOONS, supra note 248, at 22.
277. House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, at 69.
278. 33 U.S.C. § 1501(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
279. Id. § 1505.
280. Id. § 1509.
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Customs laws would be inapplicable."' Further, the President and
the Secretary were charged to enter into negotiations with Canada,
Mexico,'- and the United Nations to develop appropriate interna-
tional rules and understandings for such ports. 83
The question of jurisdiction to regulate activities in deepwater
ports on the high seas presents somewhat different questions under
international law than the question of jurisdiction to construct and
maintain them. The difficulties arise primarily with respect to for-
eign nationals in deepwater port installations and foreign vessels
within the designated safety zone. Normally, the jurisdiction of the
coastal state over foreign nationals is based on plenary territorial
sovereign jurisdiction on land284 or in the territorial sea 85 or, in some
cases, upon acts outside the territory which have a harmful conse-
quence within the territory of the coastal state.'" Such provisions
would not apply in a deepwater port because its very status as a
reasonable use of the high seas is dependent on the fact that it is
not an extension of the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state. 7
Such territoriality would create the possibility of a deepwater
port having a territorial sea of its own or otherwise affecting the
delimitation of the territorial sea, both of which are prohibited by
Article 5 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 88 Such an
effect would also create great problems of creeping jurisdiction or
otherwise using such installations to extend the territorial sea. In-
tense opposition to such an outcome would be foreseeable. 9 The
basis of regulatory jurisdiction may not, therefore, be territorial.
One solution would be to analogize to the jurisdiction of the
coastal state on resource related installations, recognized under Ar-
ticle 5. While this might be sufficient to support civil jurisdiction,""
it probably would not sustain the stricter, jurisdictional require-
281. Id. § 1518(d).
282. Id. § 1521.
283. Id. § 1510.
284. See generally SooNs, supra note 248, at 21.
285. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 2.
286. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States v.
Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974); Deutsche Lufthansa A.G. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
287. High Seas Convention, supra note 73, art. 2.
288. Shelf Convention, supra note 243, art. 5(4).
289. See Knight, supra note 249, at 384-85.
290. In most cases, civil actions accruing on the high seas are cognizable under the
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts in any case.
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ments of criminal prosecutions.' This is particularly true where the
impact felt within the United States is minimal, as in violation of
regulations causing damage or injury. Under such circumstances,
fifth amendment due process would be strained in giving effect to
the extraterritorial jurisdiction under domestic law without regard
to its validity under international law.29 Similarly, an analogy to
extraterritorial jurisdiction in roadsteads beyond the territorial
sea29 buttresses the position of the deepwater port as a reasonable
use of the high seas, but does not support the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction.2"4
Thus, the best solution to the exercise of jurisdiction on offshore
deepwater ports over foreign nationals and vessels would seem to be
to obtain the flag state's agreement to the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion. 95 This, in fact, is the solution adopted by Congress. It provides
that foreign vessels will not be permitted to call at high seas deep-
water ports unless the flag state has specifically agreed to recognize
the jurisdiction of the United States over the vessel and its person-
nel while they are in the port.'
In summary, it would seem clear that the establishment of
"superports" on the high seas and the regulation of activities therein
is valid under international law provided due consideration is given
to the factors discussed above. There is much, however, that can be
clarified and improved by effective international cooperation. Uni-
form international standards for the construction of such ports must
be adopted, and the legal status of such ports as an acceptable use
of the high seas should be codified so that it is no longer necessary
to rely on analogies to other uses to support the construction of such
ports. International attention should also be given to the jurisdic-
tional problems involved with regulating the activities of foreign
nationals and foreign vessels in connection with offshore deepwater
ports as well. 7
291. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
292. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
293. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 60, art. 9.
294. See House DWP Hearings, supra note 222, at 73, where the United States specifi-
cally rejects the roadstead analogy as supporting jurisdiction over deepwater ports by itself.
295. See note 68 supra.
296. 33 U.S.C. § 1518(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
297. There remains the problem of amending a multitude of international conventions,
which have provisions concerning harbors and ports, so that they also include such offshore
ports. For a comprehensive treatment of the necessary amendments, see House DWP Hear-
ings, supra note 222, at 86-89.
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It is in the interest of all nations that such efforts be undertaken
as soon as possible so that such facilities are available, not only to
expedite commerce in oil and commodities, but so that the marine
environment can benefit immediately from the added prevention of
traumatic pollution that will result from the widespread use of such
ports.
In passing the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974,98 Congress at-
tempted to reconcile all of the various state, national, and interna-
tional interests involved while providing a flexible framework for the
rapid construction of such ports. The Act limits its effect to deepwa-
ter ports outside the 3 mile limit 9 and further restricts the use of
such facilities to the loading and unloading of oil.10 It establishes
licensing requirements, procedures, and criteria for deepwater
ports.10' Licenses are issued by the Secretary of Transportation,'
who exercises regulatory authority through his control of the license
application process. 303 License applications must set forth in detail
construction plans, proposed ownership and other information0 4
and must be circulated to other concerned federal agencies for com-
ment"5 as well as to the Attorney General for an antitrust determi-
nation.'"' An environmental impact statement is required, °7 and
criteria for environmental review of the statement is set forth in the
Act °.30 The Secretary is empowered to establish regulations for the
protection of the marine environment and for the promotion of navi-
gational safety, including rules for vessel movement, loading and
unloading procedures, lights and warning devices, and the declara-
tion of safety zones around the port. 9
The Act further prohibits the discharge of oil into the waters
at a deepwater port.3 10 The owner/operator of the vessel or licensee
of the port is not only liable for a $10,000 civil penalty for the
298. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
299. Id. § 1502(10).
300. Id. § 1503(a).
301. Id. § 1503.
302. Id. § 1503(b).
303. Id. § 1504(a).
304. Id. §§ 1503(c)-(h), 1504(a)-(c).
305. Id. § 1504(e)(1).
306. Id. § 1506.
307. Id. § 1504(f).
308. Id. § 1505.
309. Id. § 1509.
310. Id. § 1517(a)(1).
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spillage, but must give prompt notice to authorities or face an addi-
tional fine."' The vessel owner/operator is also strictly liable for
clean-up costs and damages resulting from such discharges up to a
limit of $150 per gross ton or $20,000,000, whichever is less.3" The
port licensee is also strictly liable for oil discharged from the port
or from a vessel moored at the port, up to a limit of $50,000,000, thus
placing him in the position of an insurer of the vessel with regard
to oil discharge clean-up costs and damages in excess of the
$20,000,000 owner/operator liability. 3
The Act creates a Deepwater Port Liability Fund which will
provide money for clean-up costs and for damage claimants not
actually compensated by vessel owner/operators or a port licensee.
The Fund, backed by the United States Treasury, will constitute
$100,000,000 to be collected by deepwater port licensees in the form
of a user's fee of 2 cents per barrel of oil loaded or unloaded at the
port." 4 The Act also establishes procedures by which individuals
damaged by oil pollution from a deepwater port may be represented
by the United States Attorney-General in a class action." 5
The interests of coastal states of the United States are pro-
tected by the Deepwater Ports Act in a number of ways."' Adjacent
coastal states"7 may set reasonable fees for the use of deepwater port
facilities and land based support facilities in addition to proper
taxes on the latter. These fees are designed as compensation to the
state for otherwise unrecoverable economic, environmental, and
administrative costs attributable to the construction and operation
of such facilities and must be approved by the Secretary." Far more
311. Id. §§ 1517(a)(2)-(b).
312. Id. § 1517(d).
313. Id. § 1517(e). The owner/operator or licensee may escape liability only by showing
that the damage resulted from an act of war, negligence of the United States Government in
maintaining aids to navigation or due solely to the negligence of the injured party. Id. §
1517(g). The owner/operator of a vessel and the DWP licensee must furnish evidence of their
ability to meet these potential liabilities. Id. § 1517(1).
314. Id. § 1517(f).
315. Id. § 1516(i).
316. One of the declared purposes of the Act is to "protect the rights and responsibilities
of States and communities to regulate growth, determine land use, and otherwise protect the
environment .... " Id. § 1501(a)(4).
317. Adjacent coastal states are those connected to a deepwater port by pipeline, located
within 15 miles of a deepwater port or designated as such by the Secretary of Transportation.
Id. § 1502(1).




important to adjacent coastal states is the Act's provision that the
Secretary may not issue a license without the approval of the Gover-
nor of each adjacent coastal state."9 Further, if requested by the
Governor, the Secretary must condition the issuance of a license on
compliance with state environmental protection programs. ' Licen-
ses will not be issued unless the state is making "reasonable prog-
ress" toward a coastal zone management program for the area im-
pacted by the deepwater port."2 ' States may also apply jointly to
own, construct, or operate a deepwater port themselves,2 ' and they
may impose additional requirements or liability for the discharge of
oil from a deepwater port.3 The law of the adjacent coastal state
within whose extended boundaries the deepwater port would be
located applies to the port, but is administered by federal authori-
ties." 4
Since the passage of the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974,25 work
has gone forward in developing the regulatory framework necessary
to supervise the construction and operation of the deepwater
ports.36 The regulatory concept2 is not the promulgation of a blan-
ket set of regulations covering all deepwater ports, but rather deals
with each deepwater port individually because of the wide dispari-
ties between ports due to local geomorphic, demographic, and me-
teorological conditions. The regulations, therefore, are broadly con-
structed guidelines as to what must be furnished with the license
application for review, rather than specifying the nuts and bolts of
deepwater port construction.3 8 The regulatory development and
administration of the license application process has been delegated
319. Disapproval must be transmitted to the Secretary within prescribed time limits or
approval will be conclusively presumed. Id. § 1508(b)(1).
320. Id.
321. As set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq. (Supp.
11, 1973). Reasonable progress is defined as at least being in receipt of a planning grant under
33 U.S.C. § 1508(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
322. 33 U.S.C. § 1508(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
323. Id. § 1517(k).
324. Id. § 1518(b).
325. Id. §§ 1501 et seq.
326. The Secretary of Transportation has delegated much of this work to the Coast
Guard because of their special expertise and responsibilities in this area.
327. 33 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. IV, 1974).
328. See, e.g., DRAFT DWP/EIS, supra note 223. The objective of the regulations is to
eliminate 90 percent of possible oil spillage, this being the most cost effective level of regula-
tion. The anticipated savings in reduction of environmental and vessel damage and asso-
ciated costs is in excess of $50 million over the next 15 years. Id. at 8.
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by the Secretary to the United States Coast Guard in its role as the
premier federal agency in the areas of maritime safety, marine tech-
nology, and marine environmental protection. Guidelines already
exist to assist the license applicant in the preparation of his opera-
tions manual,329 design criteria,330 and environmental impact state-
ment.3 ' Every effort has been made to ensure that such ports will
be safely constructed with the absolute minimum of environmental
impact from both their construction and operation. If these regula-
tions are effectively implemented and administered, United States
deepwater ports will be valuable contributions to our future eco-
nomic and ecological well-being.
V. CONCLUSION
It is readily apparent from the foregoing discussion of the pre-
vention of traumatic oil pollution and its causes that the problem
is complex and multifaceted. It is also apparent that a multitude
of measures may be undertaken to reduce not only the tragic ecolog-
ical effects of such pollution, but also the attendant human suffer-
ing and economic damage. These solutions are available now. The
effective prevention of traumatic pollution does not have to await
any technological breakthrough or the completion of any scientific
assessment of the problem. The problem has been thoroughly stud-
ied and its nature, causes, and impact are well understood. The
tools to combat it are at hand.
329. See generally DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COAST GUARD, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR
PREPARATION OF A DEEPWATER PORTS OPERATIONS MANUAL (1975). The manual must set forth
in detail the provisions covering the organization of the DWP in a multitude of areas includ-
ing personnel assignments and duties, vessel control procedures, cargo transfer procedures,
logistics, environmental monitoring, accident and emergency procedures, safety measures,
and equipment and general installation security.
330. See generally DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COAST GUARD, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR
DEVELOPING DEEPWATER PORTS DESIGN CRITERIA (1975). The design requirements are primarily
oriented to the use of the Single Point Mooring (SPM). The platforms and SPM's must be
designed to withstand the "hundred year" worst storm wind and wave for the site as sup-
ported by statistical information. Operating wind, wave, and current at which the largest size
vessel to be handled will remain moored must also be provided as well as account taken of
seiche nodals, tidal data, visibility, temperature range, and icing conditions.
331. See generally DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, COAST GUARD, DRAFT GUIDE TO PREP-
ARATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSES FOR DEEPWATER PORTS (1974). The analyses must include
figures on the impact of the port on socio-cultural, demographic, governmental, historic,
commercial and recreational factors, as well as land and water use. A full statement of the
oceanographic, hydrologic, meteorologic, climatologic, geologic, geographic and topographic
parameters of the site area must be included. The analyses must also take into account
alternative sites and port construction techniques.
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While many of these measures may be taken unilaterally by
nations economically capable of such efforts, the total solution to
global traumatic oil pollution lies only in real and genuine
international cooperation. The world's nations must realize that
ending this major threat to the world ecosystem depends solely on
their will. An appreciation of this all too simple reality will hope-
fully result in a world effort to cooperate in enforcing appropriate
collision rules, construction and equipment standards, licensing
requirements, and vessel traffic systems; and also to aid less fortun-
ate nations in developing such systems, standards, aids to naviga-
tion, and other requirements for a viable and safe international
commerce. Such an effort will result not only in ending a major
problem from the list of ills that plague the world but, with a little
luck, may prove a model for tackling the others.
